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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
Lori Ramsay and Dan Smalling; 
Utah State Retirement Board; and 
Kane County Human Resource Special Service District. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann §78A-4-103(2)(a). 
Administrative Hearing Officer Dennis Frederick entered a Final Order on June 4, 2015. 
The Utah State Retirement Board ("USRB ") entered its Final Order, based on the June 4, 
2015 Final Order, on June 18, 2015. Appellants filed their Petition for Review on July 
20, 2015. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue number 1 : Did the creation of a defined contribution plan by the Kane County 
Human Resource Special Service District ("KCH") in the form of 401 (k) accounts for its 
employees in 1993 trigger a requirement that KCH provide the full level of defined 
benefits as required under the Utah State Retirement Act, U.C.A. § 49-11-101 et. seq. 
("the Act")? 
Issue number 2: If KCH is subject to the full funding requirements of the Act for its 
employees, is the three year limitation of action in place for Lori Ramsay ("Ramsay") 
and Dan Smalling ("Smalling") to bring a claim for unpaid retirement fund contributions 
from KCH tolled in light of their lack of knowledge of the obligation KCH had to provide 
them the full retirement benefits package under the Act? 
Standard of Review 
Whether KCH was required to provide to its employees the defined benefits 
required under the Act, in addition to the defined contribution 401 (k) payments, is a 
question of law involving statutory interpretation and is subject to a de novo standard of 
6 
review providing no deference to the original decision-maker's legal conclusions. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ,r 32,299 P.3d 990, 1001 (UT 
2012). 
As to the second issue, "the applicability of a statute of limitations and the 
applicability of the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review for correctness." 
Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ,I32. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
The following are central to the Appellants' appeal: 
• U.C.A. § 49-13-202 
• U .C.A. § 78B-2-305( 4) 
• U.C.A. § 63G-7-401 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
KCH operates the Kane County Hospital in Kanab, Utah. KCH is a governmental 
entity, a special service district, which acts as a subdivision of the State of Utah. In 1993, 
it decided, for the first time, to offer retirement benefits to its employees. It established a 
defined contribution retirement program where it allowed employees to set up 401 (k) 
retirement accounts and agreed to provide matching contributions up to certain 
percentages to employees who wanted to set money aside for their retirement. Apparently 
KCH did not consult with or coordinate its decision to set up the 401(k) defined 
contribution plan with the Utah State Retirement Office or any other individual charged 
with administering or monitoring the activities of the State of Utah or its political 
7 
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subdivisions to ensure they comply with the requirements of the Act. In fact, the Act 
required that once a political subdivision of the state of Utah, such as KCH, sets up any 
retirement program for its employees, it is obligated to comply completely with the Act 
in providing the full range of defined retirement benefits to employees. That range of 
defined benefits was significantly more extensive and beneficial to the employees than 
simply providing 40l(k) accounts as KCH did in 1993. 
The difference between defined contribution retirement plans, such as KCH set up 
in 1993, and defined benefit retirement plans, such as required by the Act, is described by 
the U.S. Department of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm 
(last accessed 11/30/15). A defined benefit plan specifies how much money an employee 
will receive at retirement. Id. During the employee's working career, the risk of loss in 
the portfolio of assets necessary for the employer to fund those retirement benefits stays 
with the employer or its agents. Conversely, a defined contribution retirement plan does 
not promise a specific amount to the employee at retirement. Id. Rather, the employer 
makes contributions on a regular basis over the employee's working career to a 
retirement account set up for each specific employee. Consequently, once the employer 
makes its contribution to the employee, whether those funds gain or lose value during 
after that is controlled by the investments the employee chooses. The risk of loss ( or gain) 
is with the employee, not the employer. 
It was not until 2007 that the Utah State Retirement Office became aware that 
KCH was providing defined contribution retirement benefits in the form of 401 (k) 
retirement accounts to its employees. The Utah State Retirement Board ("USRB"), acting 
8 
to enforce the Act, filed a Notice of Board Action against KCH on August 11, 2009. The 
Notice of Board Action alleged that the establishment of the 401(k) required KCH to 
participate fully in the Utah Retirement Systems ("the System") and make retirement 
contributions to fund the service credits accumulated by KCH employees for the full 
package of defined benefits, not just the defined contribution 401 (k) benefit package 
KCH had created. USRB alleged this was required by the Act. Ramsay and Smalling, 
employees of KCH and participants in the KCH retirement plan, subsequently filed a 
Motion to Intervene in the Board Action, which was granted. 
USRB alleged that KCH was responsible to make contributions for KCH's eligible 
employees from 1993 through April of 2009, when KCH opted out of participating in the 
System. However, the Administrative Hearing Officer ruled that the applicable statute of 
limitations for USRB to bring a claim against KCH for funding of the service credits 
accumulated by employees was three years before the filing of the Board action in 2009. 
Consequently, the hearing officer ruled that USRB had no claims for funding of service 
credits for the time frame before 2006. 
Fallowing the decision on the statute of limitations question against USRB, KCH 
and USRB worked to provide information to all eligible KCH employees about what 
defined benefits the employees were entitled to under USRB' s argument, including, but 
not limited to, service credits for the complete package of defined benefit retirement 
money in the System for the three year period from 2006 to 2009. Eventually, all but six 
of the KCH employees agreed to sign an Affidavit Relinquishing Service Credit 
("Affidavit") in return for a lump sum payment to each signing employee that represented 
9 
r··, 
'VJjjl 
a settlement of the claims the KCH employees could have had to the full package of 
defined benefits USRB asserted KCH was obligated to provide to KCH employees for 
the 2006-2009 time frame. As to the remaining six KCH employees, including Ramsay 
and Smalling, KCH made all required payments to USRB, including interest, for the 
period between 2006 and 2009 to fund the employees' service credits for the defined 
benefits. USRB moved for dismissal of the Board Action on May 16, 2014, in light of 
the resolution of its complaint against KCH. The hearing officer granted USRB's Motion 
on June 17, 2014. 
KCH then filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment against Ramsay and 
Smalling on the basis of the limitation of action defense. Ramsay and Smalling argued 
they were entitled to tolling of the three year limitation of action on the basis of the 
discovery rule and that they are entitled to contributions from KCH to the System for 
service credits for the entire period of their eligibility from the dates each began working 
at KCH through 2009, and not just for the three-year period from 2006 through 2009. 
After receiving briefing on the issue and entertaining oral argument, the hearing officer 
ruled in favor of KCH and ruled that Ramsay and Smalling' s claim for payment of 
service credits against KCH was limited to the time from from 2006-2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ramsay was hired at KCH in March of 1988 and was employed there in 
1993 when the 401 (k) plan was created. Ramsay participated in the 401 (k) plan 
from its inception. Ramsay is still actively employed at KCH. Record, 000397, 
,I2; 000572, ,8. 
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2. Smalling was hired at KCH in June of 1995 and began participating in the 
40l(k) plan as soon as he was eligible to do so. Smalling continues to be actively 
employed at KCH. Record, 000395, ,I2; 000593-594, ,I,I2 and 3. 
3. In 1993, KCH decided to provide retirement benefits for its employees. It 
opted to do so by setting up a 401(k) program. Record, 000050. 
4. In setting up its 401(k) program, KCH retained the services of Dean 
Johnson, an insurance agent, and John Hancock Life Insurance Company, to assist 
KCH in ensuring the legal requirements of setting up the program were satisfied. 
Record 000048, ,Is 4-5, 000050, ,Is 16-17. 
5. Ramsay and Smalling relied on KCH to act in their interest and for their 
benefit in establishing and maintaining the 401 (k) retirement plan. Ramsay and 
Smalling reasonably expected KCH to set up a retirement plan that complied with 
all requirements of state and federal statutes. Record, 000594, ,I4. 
6. Between 1993 and 2007, KCH consistently and repeatedly communicated 
with participants in the 401 (k) program in a manner that constituted explicit or 
implicit representations that the retirement plan complied with state and federal 
statutory requirements and constituted the full and complete amount of retirement 
benefits to which Ramsay and Smalling were entitled under both the terms of the 
retirement plan and the applicable statutes. Record, 000594, ,rs. 
7. Nothing KCH did between 1993 and January, 2007, gave Ramsay and 
Smalling any reason to believe that KCH was not providing retirement benefits to 
them in a manner that complied with all state and federal statutes or that KCH had 
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violated its fiduciary duties or any other standards of care associated with the 
establishment or maintenance of a lawful governmental retirement plan for 
Ramsay and Smalling and other KCH employees. Id. 
8. Ramsay and Smalling had no knowledge before January of2007 of any 
facts that led them to believe there was any noncompliance by KCH with federal 
or state statutory requirements, applicable fiduciary standards, or relevant 
standards of care for the establishment or maintenance of defined benefit or 
defined contribution retirement plans or accounts. Record, 000594, ,14 through 7. 
9. Ramsay and Smalling were, and continue to be, employees of KCH. As 
such, they allege entitlement to funding of their retirement benefits pursuant to 
U.C.A. §49-11. Record, 000043-44. 
10. The Act establishes a statutory level of funding for any deferred retirement 
benefits established by a governmental entity such as KCH. Record, 000049. 
11. The 40l(k) program established by KCH in 1993 did not provide funding at 
the level required by the Act. Record, 000051. 
12. Sometime in 2006 or 2007, KCH employees were notified by the Internal 
Revenue Service that their 401 (k) accounts had been frozen. The 401 (k) program 
established by KCH not only violated the Act, but was contrary to the Internal 
Revenue Code. Record, 000387-388. 
13. On January 5, 2007, Ramsay contacted the Utah State Retirement Office to 
inquire about state retirement benefits. Record, 000273. 
14. Ramsay received a Retirement New Group Questionnaire from USRB and 
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Ramsay provided that document to KCH. Record, 000273, 15. 
15. KCH completed and returned the questionnaire to USRB. Record, 000273, 
16. 
16. On February 12, 2007, USRB informed KCH that it was eligible for 
membership in the System. Record, 000273, 18. 
17. KCH declined to make any retrospective or prospective contributions into 
the System. Id. 
18. During the 2009 General Legislative Session, legislation was passed to 
allow state employers to opt out of the System. Based on this change to the Act, in 
April of 2009, KCH elected not to participate in the System. Record, 000274, 19. 
19. Ramsay and Smalling were not aware of any obligation on the part of KCH 
to fund service credits for them through the Act or the System until 2009, when 
legislation was passed allowing KCH to opt out of the System. Record, 000594, 
16 and 7. 
20. On June 24, 2009, Ramsay and Smalling, through their counsel, sent notice 
of their claim for funding of unpaid retirement benefits to USRB and to KCH. 
Record, 000374, 114 and 5. 
21. The USRB filed its Notice of Board Action against KCH in which USRB 
alleged violations of the Act, on August 11, 2009. Record, 00002-10. 
22. On December 16, 2009, Ramsay and Smalling filed a Complaint in Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah ("the State Court Lawsuit"), in 
which they alleged that KCH had violated the requirements of the Act in failing to 
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fully fund the retirement benefits to which Ramsay and Smalling were entitled. 
Record, 00004 7-000059. 
23. On March 31, 2010, Ramsay and Smalling filed their Motion to Intervene 
with USRB. Ramsay and Smalling were pursuing their claims before the USRB 
contemporaneously with the State Court Lawsuit. Record, 000043-44. 
24. Attached to the Motion to Intervene was a copy of the Complaint filed in 
the State Court Lawsuit. Record, 00004 7-59. 
25. The State Court Lawsuit was dismissed by the Third District Court judge, 
Ramsay and Smalling appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. Ramsay v. Kane County Human Resources Special Services 
District, 2012 UT App 97. KCH filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the 
Supreme Court which was granted. 
26. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the State Court 
Lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. Ramsay v. Kane County Human Resources 
Special Services District, 2014 UT 5, 118, 322 P.3d 1163. The Court ruled that 
Ramsay and Smalling's claims fell within the scope of the Act and that they were 
required to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit in district court. 
27. In 2012, the Utah Legislature passed HB 512 which created a grant 
program for rural county health care special service districts like KCH to help 
them meet state retirement liability. Record, 000333, 121. 
28. Following disposition of other issues in the matter, KCH filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support on March 1, 2013. 
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KC H's Motion specifically addressed the issue of whether the applicable statute of 
limitations limited the USRB' s action to collect funding for the KCH employee 
service credits to the three-year period preceding the Notice of Board Action filed 
against KCH. Record, 000266-267; 000269-280. 
29. Ramsay and Smalling submitted their Memorandum in Opposition to 
KCH's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 3, 2013. Record, 000371-
381. 
30. The USRB Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Undisputed Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Partial Summary Judgment on August 26, 2013 ("2013 
Decision"). Record, 000422-431. 
31. The 2013 Decision did not address whether or not KCH was, in fact, 
subject to the Act but, rather, referred to the parties' agreement to assume that 
KCH was required to fund retirement benefits in the System for purposes of 
KCH's Motion. Record, 000425. 
32. The 2013 Decision granted KCH's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and held that the applicable statute of limitations limited contribution claims by 
USRB against KCH to the period between 2006 and 2009. Record, 000427. 
33. KCH applied for, and received, a grant from the State Department of Health 
to fund the retirement liability owed to the USR for KCH employees. Record, 
000333, 123. 
34. KCH used the grant from taxpayers to pay a lump sum settlement to all 
eligible employees, with the exception of six individuals including Ramsay and 
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Smalling, to relinquish any claim for Service Credits from the System. Record, 
000535. 
35. Only then did KCH file a second Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Ramsay and Smalling on the limitation of action grounds. It submitted a 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment specifically 
relating to Ramsay and Smalling's claims on August 18, 2014. Record, 000534-
000544. 
36. Ramsay and Smalling filed their Memorandum in Opposition to KHC's 
Motion on December 3, 2014. Ramsay and Smalling maintained that they were 
entitled to funding of their benefits for their entire period of eligibility. Record, 
000569-5 83. 
37. IfKCH was not required to provide funding for Ramsay and Smalling to 
receive service credits toward their retirement through the System for their years 
of eligible employment, Ramsay would lose her service credits toward retirement 
for the period between 1993 and 2006 and Smalling would lose any and all 
retirement benefits to which he would be entitled as an employee at KCH between 
1995 and 2006. Record, 000595, ,I13. 
38. The information necessary for KCH to calculate and provide funding for 
Ramsay and Smalling's service credits from 1993 and 1995 through the dates of 
their retirements is currently in the possession ofKCH and/or USRB. Record, 
000595, ,Il4. 
39. A final Findings of Undisputed Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary 
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Judgment was entered on May 18, 2015. The hearing officer ruled that the 
applicable statute of limitations restricted the time frame for which Ramsay and 
Smallings' retirement benefits should be funded to the period between 2006 and 
2009. Record, 000658-666. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As for the first issue, once KCH established a defined contribution plan for its 
employees in the form of setting up 401(k) accounts in 1993, it was required to provide 
its employees funding for the full level of defined benefits under the Act. U.C.A. § 49-
13-202. The actions ofKCH in negotiating with, and settling, claims or potential claims 
from USRB and the employees of KCH for the time frame from 2006 to 2009 make it 
clear that KCH recognizes and acknowledges this obligation. It is necessary for this Court 
to establish explicitly this obligation of KCH in connection with the claims Ramsay and 
Smalling are asserting against KCH. 
With regard to the second issue, Ramsay and Smalling are entitled to funding of 
their defined benefit retirement accounts by KCH from the time they first became 
employed at KCH to the date KCH withdrew from the System in 2009 rather than for 
only the three year period from 2009 to 2006. Because they did not have, and could not 
reasonably have gained, knowledge before 2009 that KCH was obligated to fund service 
credits to allow them to receive the complete defined retirement benefits provided for 
under the Act for the entire time they were employed at KCH, the limitation of action that 
otherwise would have accrued and required them to bring a claim should be tolled to 
allow them three years from 2009 to assert their claims. Because they filed their claims in 
17 
a timely manner, they should be allowed to assert claims to payment of the full package 
of retirement benefits under the Act for the entire time they were employed at KCH 
through the date KCH withdrew from the System. 
ARGUMENT 
I. KCH WAS SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT 
A critical threshold issue to final resolution of this matter is a question that was 
raised and thoroughly discussed in the parties' briefing but was never specifically 
ruled on by the USRB Hearing Officer. Did the creation of the 401(k) retirement plan 
by KCH for its employees in 1993 constitute "opting in" to the Act in a manner that 
required KCH to fully fund the defined benefit retirement money under the Act? 
USRB has maintained throughout the case that KCH did opt in to the Act and was 
bound by its requirements in 1993. Ramsay and Smalling agree. KCH, on the other 
hand, has not conceded this point and the USRB Hearing Officer did not specifically 
address that question. Ramsay and Smalling are entitled to a ruling on this issue. 
KCH's actions since the Notice of Board Action was filed by USRB and Ramsay 
and Smalling were allowed to intervene indicate that KCH recognized it had an 
obligation to fully fund defined benefit retirement funds for its employees. Faced 
with the difficult prospect of having to fund service credits through the System for all 
eligible employees at KCH from 1993 through 2009, KCH asked the Utah Legislature 
to amend the Act to allow political subdivisions to opt out of participation in the 
System. Legislation was enacted in 2009 and KCH opted out. U.C.A. §§ 49-12-202, 
49-12-203, 49-13-202, and 49-13-203. However, KCH recognized its ongoing 
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responsibility to eligible employees during the three-year period preceding the 
legislation and KCH's opt out. For the three-year period, KCH accessed funding 
made available through U.C.A. § 26-9-5, enacted in 2012, to purchase service credits 
for eligible employees who wanted them or, in the alternative, to provide a lump sum 
payment for those eligible employees who waived their right to service credits. The 
need for legislative action in 2009 to provide an "out" for governmental employers 
who had not been, for whatever reason, meeting their obligations under the Act, 
reinforces the arguments of both USRB and Ramsay and Smalling. 
After opting out of the Act in April of 2009, KCH recognized its obligations to 
fund at least the three years of service credits from 2006 to 2009 for those employees 
who wanted service credits for retirement. However, KCH has never expressly 
admitted in this matter that it became a participating employer in the System when it 
set up the 401 (k) plan in 1993. The Hearing Officer also did not issue a holding on 
the question, in spite of Ramsay and Smalling's explicit request that he do so. Record 
000573-575. 
Ramsay and Smalling also argued in the Interveners' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Kane County Hospital Motion for Partial Summary Judgment involving the claims 
asserted against KCH by the USl_lB that the hearing officer needed to rule on this 
specific issue: 
This tribunal has not yet determined whether or not KCH's action in setting up a 
401 (k) program for its employees obligated KCH to provide a full level of funding 
of defined benefits to each qualified employee under the Act. As a result, KCH's 
motion asks the [Board] hearing officer to rule without necessary factual and legal 
information relating to KCH's obligations under the Act. 
19 
/.~·-, 
\lilil 
Record, 000378. KCH's actions in seeking legislation to allow it to opt out of the Act, 
seeking taxpayer funding for payment of three years of service credits for its 
employees, and negotiating a lump sum settlement with most of the eligible 
employees in 2014, make clear KCH knows it was a participating, if unwilling, 
employer in the System before April 30, 2009. Ramsay and Smalling are entitled to a 
ruling from this Court that specifically establishes their rights to funding from KCH 
for their retirement benefits under the Act. 
II. RAMSAY AND SMALLING ARE ENTITLED TO FUNDING FOR 
FULL BENEFITS UNDER THE ACT FROM THE TIME THEIR 
RESPECTIVE EMPLOYMENTS BEGAN UNTIL KCH'S OPT OUT OF 
THE ACT IN 2009 
Ramsay and Smalling were not aware of the fact that KCH was subject to the 
requirements of the Act in fully funding Ramsay and Smalling the full defined benefit 
retirement values for Ramsay and Smalling rather than just the smaller values for funding 
defined contribution retirement accounts under the 40 I (k)s set up by KCH. KCH never 
informed them of the fact that they had the legal right to the Act's defined benefit 
retirement money. Nor did USRB inform Ramsay and Smalling of that fact. 
Indeed, as part of the claims brought in State Court Lawsuit, Ramsay and Smalling 
alleged that both KCH and USRB were negligent and breached their fiduciary duties to 
Ramsay and Smalling by not informing them of their right to defined benefit retirement 
money in addition to the defined contribution retirement money. Record 000055-000057. 
Despite the fact that both KCH and USRB had fiduciary obligations to act in the interests 
of Ramsay, Smalling, and the other employees ofKCH when it came to dealing with 
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their retirement benefits, both KCH and USRB failed to either recognize the need for 
KCH to fully fund the employees' retirement benefits, or monitor KCH' s activities in a 
way that would uncover KCH's noncompliance with the Act in a timely way. 
Even if the Court is not satisfied that Ramsay and Smalling's interests were 
protected and their claims raised by the August, 2009, USRB Notice of Board Action, 
Ramsay and Smalling sent Notices of Claim to KCH, in June of 2009, and USRB, in 
August, 2009, putting those entities on notice of their claims. They did this to preserve 
their rights to bring claims under U.C.A. § 63G-7-401 et. seq. ("the GIA"). They 
followed up with the filing of the State Court Lawsuit on December 16, 2009, in the time 
frame required under the GIA, U.C.A. § 63G-7-402. Thus, the very latest date that KCH 
can argue Ramsay and Smalling took action to establish their claim was December 16, 
2009. 
A. The Discovery Rule Tolls the Three Year Limitation of Action 
that Applies to This Case. 
KCH has consistently argued that the limitation of action period that applies to this 
case is U.C.A. §78B-2-305(4), which establishes a three-year limitation period for 
"liability created by the statutes of this state." The GIA states that the statute of 
limitations for claims against governmental entities does not begin to run until "a 
claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known: (i) that 
the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee .... " U.C.A. § 
63G-7-401(1)(b)(i). This is the same standard utilized under the discovery rule argued 
before the USRB. Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 82, 122 citing In Re Hoopiiana Trust, 
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2006 UT 53,135. 
The discovery rule "balances the equitable interests of the potential plaintiff and 
defendant where the potential plaintiff has discoveryed [new] facts forming the basis for 
the cause of action." Berneau, at 122. Before the hearing officer, Ramsay and Smalling 
argued they satisfied the discovery rule because KCH engaged in concealing or 
misleading conduct and also because the case represented exceptional circumstances that 
would make strict application of the three year limitation of action "irrational or unjust, 
regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevent the discovery of the cause of 
action." Russell Packard Development Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,125. 
The Supreme Court differentiated between a discovery rule that depends on the 
application of language in a statute of limitations that, by its own terms, "mandates 
application of the discovery rule" and a discovery rule based on equitable considerations. 
Russell Packard at 121-25. The terms ofU.C.A. § 78B-2-305(4), the limitation of action 
that identifies the three-year period applicable in this case, does not contain any discovery 
rule. However, the GIA does contain a statutory discovery provision within its terms. 
Before the hearing officer the parties did not specifically discuss the statutory 
discovery rule in U.C.A. § 630-7-401. That statute involving claims against state entities 
or their subdivisions states that the cause of action that applies is the same one that would 
be in place if the claim were brought between private parties, U.C.A. § 63G-7-401(1)(a), 
and that it does not begin to run until "a claimant knew, or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known: ... that the claimant had a claim against the 
governmental entity or its employee .... " U.C.A. § 63G-7-401(1)(b)(i). Given the close 
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and overlapping relationship between the discovery rule briefed and decided by the 
USRB hearing officer and the statutory discovery rule outlined in U.C.A. § 63G-7-
401 ( 1 )(b )(i), it is proper for this Court to evaluate whether Ramsay and Smalling knew, 
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of facts to 
justify a claim against KCH under the GIA and to have the results of that evaluation 
guide the application of the discovery rule in this matter. 
Before determining whether equitable tolling shall be applied, "the plaintiff must 
make an initial showing that he did not know nor should have reasonably known the facts 
underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably comply with the limitations period." 
Highland at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, ,42, citing Berneau, 
,23. Utah case law also makes clear that the applicable statute of limitations begins to run 
for a claim only after the occurrence of the last fact that allows for the bringing of the 
action. Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436, 1 18, 
citing Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,86 (Utah 1981). 
Ramsay and Smalling are still actively employed with KCH, have not retired, and 
do not intend to retire in the near future. It could be argued that the statute of limitations 
for them has not yet begun to run. Claimants in similar situations have asserted that 
claims in connection with retirement benefits cannot be brought prior to the actual 
retirement of the claimant. See e.g., Bailey v. Shelby County, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
333, *22. However, Ramsay and Smalling brought their claim for funding of their 
retirement benefits prior to retiring and KCH has not objected to the claim being raised 
prior to their retirement. KCH never asserted that Ramsay or Smalling lacked standing or 
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that their ability to make a claim had yet to be realized. 
B. The Failure of KCH to Disclose to Ramsay and Smalling its 
Status as a Participating Employer in the System Prevented 
Ramsay and Smalling from Knowing of the Existence of their 
Cause of Action and Tolls the Statute of Limitations 
This Court has stated: 
Statutes of limitations "are designed to promote justice by preventing 
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 920 P.2d 575,578 (Utah App. 1996), citing Becton 
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). However, the running of a 
limitation of action may be tolled based on a claimant's lack of knowledge of facts 
sufficient to allow him to recognize or bring a claim that would otherwise exist. 
Colosimo, 120. The language of the GIA echoes the general equitable tolling concept 
when it references when a claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should have known that the claimant had a claim against a governmental entity or its 
employee. 
KCH engaged in conduct that constituted concealment or otherwise violated their 
fiduciary obligations to its employees. KCH knew, or should have known, that its actions 
in setting up the 401(k) defined contribution plan for its eligible employees in 1993 
constituted an opt in to the System and carried with it the obligation to fund at the full 
amount the defined benefits required by the Act. KCH failed to report to the USRB that 
it had set up a retirement plan for its employees. This was a violation of the Act. U.C.A. 
§ 49-11-603(1). In spite of the fact that KCH knew, or should have known, of its 
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obligations under the Act, KCH' s actions communicated to its employees, including 
Ramsay and Smalling, from 1993 through, at the earliest, 2007, that the 401 (k) plan was 
proper, legitimate, and constituted all retirement benefits to which the employees were 
entitled under state or federal statute. 
In addition to failing to carry out its obligations to its employees, KCH failed to 
report to USRB the necessary information about eligible employees. U.C.A. § 49-11-603 
states that participating employers must report to USRB, "the eligibility for service credit 
accrual of: (i) all current members; (ii) each new member as they begin employment; and 
(iii) any changes to eligibility to service credit accrual of each member." Funding or 
reporting requirements under the Act were in place from the time KCH created the 40l{k) 
plan in 1993 until 2009 when KCH opted out of the Act. If the funding and reporting 
requirements were in place, there can likewise be no question that KCH' s failure to 
provide the funding and the information required under the Act constitutes a 
concealment, whether intentional or inadvertent, of relevant information. Had KCH 
provided the funding and reporting as required, it would have led to discovery by Ramsay 
and Smalling of their entitlement to their full package of defined benefit money under the 
Act. KCH's concealing, misleading, or otherwise culpable conduct prevented Ramsay 
and Smalling from knowing or having any reason to know of their right to defined benefit 
retirement funds. 
Through no fault of their own, Ramsay and Smalling knew nothing about the Act 
or its requirements and knew nothing about their entitlement to service credits through 
the System until, at the earliest, 2007, when Ramsay contacted USRB. There was no 
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inaction or negligence on Ramsay and Smalling's parts in not pursuing the matter sooner. 
And it is appropriate, given the equitable balancing of interests between the parties 
referenced in Berneau, , 22, that as between Ramsay and Smalling and KCH, the relative 
lack of sophistication of these two employees weigh in their favor regarding tolling when 
compared with the relative experience and statutory duties KCH owed to its employees 
regarding their employment benefits. 
Before 2009, Ramsay and Smalling lacked the knowledge of the necessary facts 
which, once obtained, triggered their inquiries, their filing of their civil Lawsuit and, 
ultimately, their intervention in the matter before USRB. Colosimo, 2004 UT App. at, 
20. At the earliest, Ramsay and Smalling learned of facts to trigger their inquiry into 
both the legitimacy of the 410(k) plan and the possibility of obtaining service credits 
through the System no sooner than January of 2007. Eventually the information they 
obtained led them to understand that they had claims. They diligently pursued that 
information and perfected those claims in a timely way. That is all that is required under 
Colosimo and under the GIA. 
In Colosimo the Supreme Court ruled that because the plaintiffs were aware of the 
facts underlying the conduct that gave rise to a cause of action at the time the wrongful 
conduct occurred, there would be no tolling of the limitation of action based on the 
discovery rule. But this case is different. Ramsay and Smalling knew that KCH was 
providing 401 (k) benefits. But they did not know that doing so triggered a legal 
requirement under the Act for KCH to provide the full package of retirement benefits 
above and beyond the 40l(k) plans. The lack of knowledge of this fact tolls the running 
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of the limitation of action under Colosimo and under U.C.A. § 63G-7-40l(l)(b)(i). 
KCH argues that lack of knowledge of the existence of a cause of action is not a 
basis for tolling a limitation of action. Record, 000542. But it was not a lack of 
knowledge of a cause of action that existed for Ramsay and Smalling. They lacked 
knowledge of essential facts that were necessary before they could reasonably be 
expected to take action to bring a course of action to protect their rights to retirement 
benefits. These facts included that when KCH established its 401(k) program in 1993, 
the action obligated KCH to provide full retirement benefits to its employees under the 
Act, that Ramsay and Smalling were eligible to obtain service credits in the System for 
their years of employment at KCH from 1993 onward, that KCH had an obligation to 
fund retirement benefits for Ramsay and Smalling based on those service credits, and 
that, once they retired, Ramsay and Smalling were entitled to retirement benefits above 
and beyond the 41 0(k) benefits they had been promised. These facts were all unknown to 
Ramsay and Smalling until, at earliest, 2007. And the primary reason Ramsay and 
Smalling were unaware of those facts was because KCH, in violation of the Act, failed to 
report to USRB that it had established a retirement plan for its employees, failed to fund 
the full package of benefits for the employees, and failed to inform the employees that 
they were entitled to the defined benefit retirement monies under the Act. 
Ramsay and Smalling believed that the retirement plan established for them as 
employees of KCH, the 401 (k) plan, was a proper and legitimate plan and provided all 
benefits available to them. In light of the requirements of the Act, they were mistaken. 
Until they became aware of facts informing them of their right to full retirement benefits, 
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they were not in a position to take any action to preserve their rights. Whether tolling of 
the limitation of action is reviewed under the GIA language or under the equitable 
discovery rule, the absence of any reason for Ramsay and Smalling to know of their right 
to retirement benefits above and beyond their 401 (k) plans constitutes a circumstance that 
makes application of the three year limitation of action irrational and unjust. 
noted: 
In Helfrich v. Adams, 2013 UT App. 37,299 P.3d 2, the Utah Court of Appeals 
"The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional 
circumstances is a question of law and turns on a balancing test" that 
"examines [t]he hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the 
plaintiff ... [against] a prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of 
proof caused by the passage of time." 
Id., at 18, quoting Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87,123,223 P.3d 1128. The balancing 
test led the Utah Court of Appeals to determine that exceptional circumstances did not 
exist in Helfrich. However, in this case, the test produces a different result. In Helfrich, 
the claimants failed to demonstrate that they had been misled or that facts had been 
concealed from them to the satisfaction of either the trial court or the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The appellate court went further and explained that: 
Failure to disclose is not fraudulent unless a fiduciary relationship exists, 
which requires "not only confidence of the one in the other, but ... [also] 
a certain inequality, dependence, weakness of age, of mental strength, 
business intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved, or other conditions, 
giving to one advantage over the other." 
Id. at 15, citing First Sec. Bank of Utah NA v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 
(Utah 1990). Such a fiduciary relationship did not exist for the claimant in Helfrich. 
In this case, there was a fiduciary relationship between KCH and Ramsay and 
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Smalling. In establishing the 401(k) plan for its employees, KCH had all the information 
regarding what needed to be done or should have been done to comply with the 
requirements of the Act. It retained Dean Johnson and John Hancock Life Insurance 
Company to assist KCH in setting up the 401 (k) program in a way that complied with all 
legal requirements. The only information the employees had about the program was what 
KCH chose to provide to them. As a governmental employer, KCH knew, or should have 
known, what its obligations to its employees were under relevant state and federal 
statutes.-The employees, to the extent they were aware of being governmental employees 
at all, were in a much inferior position to know ofKCH's statutory obligations in 
connection with the employer-employee relationship. 
KCH argues that the knowledge of the existence of the 401(k) plan was the only 
fact necessary to begin the running of the three-year limitation of action in this case. 
Record 000542-000543. KCH asserts that it is ofno consequence that Ramsay and 
Smalling were ignorant of the effect of the law given these facts. However, this is 
inconsistent with the argument KCH presents that it should be shielded from the effects 
of the law in terms of its own failure to comply with the requirements of the Act when it 
set up the 401(k) program in 1993. 
In Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, this Court 
rejected a very similar argument presented by a governmental employer in the context of 
an equitable tolling analysis. In Highlands a governmental subdivision, a fire district, 
argued for an earlier date than the claimants for commencing the limitation of action. The 
claimant asserted that it was not aware of the legal effect of certain facts that the fire 
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district argued commenced the running of the limitation of actions. According to the fire 
department, "all men ... [ are presumed to] know the law" in connection with when a 
limitation of action will begin running. Highlands, ,44, quoting Board of Education v. 
Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P. 1065, 1069 (Utah 1929). 
This Court made short work of that argument stating that the presumption of 
knowledge of the legal effect of certain actions should even more readily be imputed to a 
political subdivision such as the fire department. Id. The same principle applies to KCH 
as a special service district in this case. Highland supports the proposition that as between 
KCH and its employees, KCH is not in as favorable a position as the employees to ask for 
equitable consideration. And if the presumption is applied equally in this case, the 
argument that KCH engaged in concealment or misleading conduct is strengthened. 
Regardless of whether a fiduciary relationship existed, the failure to toll the 
limitation of action would be irrational and unjust. No reasonable person in the position 
of Ramsay and Smalling would know or suspect that between 1993 and 2009 they were 
entitled to defined benefit retirement money under the Act. The same cannot be said for 
the individuals at KCH who were responsible for ensuring that the KCH retirement 
benefit package complied with the Act. Highland, ,s 44-46. 
As to the balancing of hardship on the parties, it is very clear that KCH's only 
potential hardship is coming up with the funding to provide service credits for Ramsay 
and Smalling for the years between 1993 and 1995, respectively, and 2006. That 
hardship does not exist in light of the amendment to U.C.A. §26-9-5 in 2012. Funds are 
available to pay the value of the service credits Ramsay and Smalling seek. 
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KCH has, in the past, asserted that being required to fund service credits for its 
eligible employees would lead to closure of the hospital. However, no evidence has ever 
been provided to indicate that the threatened closure was anything more than a tactic to 
bully Ramsay and Smalling ( along with the other employees) into abandoning or settling 
their claims. In any event, the funding necessary to satisfy the claim no longer calls for 
sufficient capital to cover all eligible KCH employees -- only Ramsay and Smalling and, 
perhaps, the other four eligible employees who did not accept the lump sum payment to 
relinquish their service credits. 
KCH has never argued that it does not have sufficient information about Ramsay 
and Smalling's hours worked and earnings over that time frame. There is no evidence to 
indicate that the System does not have the means to quickly and accurately produce a 
dollar amount in connection with funding Ramsay and Smalling's (and th~ other four 
employees') service credits for that time frame upon request. There are no witnesses 
involved and no lost or missing information. The hardship to KCH if the statute is tolled 
would be minimal, if it exists at all. 
The hardship for Ramsay and Smalling, in contrast, would be significant. They 
relied on KCH, as their employer, to make accurate representations about the retirement 
plan in place for them as they went through the process of long-range financial planning 
for their futures. They also relied on KCH to comply with all statutory requirements in 
establishing their retirement benefits. They relied on KCH's honesty and competence to 
their detriment. 
Both Ramsay and Smalling are loyal, long-term KCH employees and intend to 
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continue working at KCH until they are able to retire. Whether they are able to retire at 
all may depend on the outcome of their claim. Ramsay stands to lose thirteen years of 
retirement benefits and Smalling will lose eleven years of retirement benefits if this 
Court upholds the decision of the USRB that the statute of limitations should not be 
tolled. Under the facts of this case, denial of retirement benefits for governmental 
employees who have demonstrated their loyalty and longevity creates an unjust outcome. 
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49-11-101 UTAH .STATE.RETIREMENT A:ND INSURANCE' BENEFIT. ACT 
Part 10 
Partial Llµnp-Suin Payinents 
Section 
49-11-1001. Partial lump-sum· payment option. 
PARTl . 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
, , .. .... :r 
49-11-101. Title. ,,. 
I j 1: 
0.) Thls title is known as the "Utah State Retiremen~ ancj 
°T:risiirance Benefit Act." . . · . " . 
·, (2) This chapter is )mown as the ''Utah State Retirement 
Syst~ms ·Ad.ministration." · 2002 
49-11-102. Definitions. 
~ -- used in this title: . , , . . . ,.,_ 
· (1) (a) "Active member" means a member wlio is "em-
ployed or who has been employed by a participating 
employer within the previous 120 days. 
,,; 
(b) "Active member" does not include retirees. 
. {2) "Actuarial /)quivalei;it" mean~ a benefit of equal 
value when computed upon the basis of mortality tables 
as reco=ended by the actuary and adopted by the 
executive director, including regular interest. · 
(3) "Actuarial interest rate~ )lleans the interest rate as 
reco~ended by the actuary· and ·adopted by the board 
~pon which the funding of system ·costs and benefits, agi 
computed. 
(4) (a) "Agency" means: ;; , ;i.: 
(i) a department, division, agency, office, au0 
thority, commission, board, institution, or h~$pl· 
ta! of the state; · ' . · · · ' • ·· · 
(ii) a county, municipality, school district, local 
district, or special service district; 
(iii) a state college or university; or 
. (iv) any other participating employe,i; .. _,.,_ · 
(b) "Ag(ln~y• does not include an entity listed under 
Subsection;_(4)(a)(i) that is a subdivision of-anottier 
· entity listed undeir Subsection''(4)(a). . - · . .. -
. ,,. . · (5) "Allowance" or "retirement allowance" means the 
pension plus the annuity, i,ncl~d.i.ng any cost of living or 
other authorized adjustments tp·tt1e pension and annuity. 
(6) "Alternate payee" means a rr{ember's former spouse 
or fami\y member eligible to receive payments under a 
Domestic Relations Order in compliance with Section 
49-11-612. " ' C 
, .: (7) _, '.'Annuity'' m~ans. monthly payments deriv~4 fr9m 
. member'·Jontributions. . .. ' 
(8) "Appointive officer" iniiaris' an employee appointed 
to a position for a definite and ·fixed term of office by 
official and 'duly recorded action of a participating em-
ployer whose· appointed· ·position is ' designated in the 
participating employer's charter, creation document, or 
' similar document, and ,vho earns during the ' first · foll 
month of the term of office $500 or more, indexed as of 
· Jan'tiary 1, 1990, as provided i.q Section 49-12-407. 
(9) (a) "At-will employee" means a· person who is em-
ployed by a participating employer and: 
. (i) who is riot entitled to· ·merit or civil service 
protection and is ' generally·' considered exempt 
from a participating employer's merit or career 
service personnel systems; . 
(ii) whose on~going ell!ployme_nt status . i~ en-
tirely at the discretion of the person's employer; 
or 
.(iii). who may be terniinated without cause by 
a designated supervisor, manager, or director. 
(b) "At-will employee" does not include a: • . 
employ~e y,ho has obtained a reasonable expe~ 
of c~n_tm~ed emplo~?;it b8:sed _ on mclusion -in·~ 
part1c1pating employers' ment system, civil ae 
protectip~ . sy~,~e!Il,, O[ c~r~e:_~ervis_e personnel rvq; 
terns, policies, or plans. 
(10) "Beneficiary" means.any·person ·entitled to · 
a .payment·irnder this title thtough 'a;rela_tionship Wi 
desigri'ated by' a ri:iember,' participant; covered indivia 
or:•iiltemate pay.ee of·a defiiied·contrib'ution plan. , 
" ' :··· (11) "Board'! means the Utah·.State Retirement Bo · 
established. under Section 49'-11~202; ·· , . · . , · •A 
(12) "136ard memb_er'! mean,s· a person. serving ·on~tfie 
Utah'·State Retirement Board' as estaliHshed und~r-Si$;. 
tion 49-11-202. , • 
{13) "Contributions•' means the total amount pai 
the p/lrlicipating employer and the. member into a 
or · to the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retire 
: ' Plan under Chapter 19, Utah Governors' and Legislii . 
'·Retirehiei:it Act: : ' · · · · · 
(14J' :"C'ouncil member" me'ans a· person serving 011 toe•· 
Membership 'C?uncil eslabli5?ed under · Section 4fi_iJ. 
202.' . . • . --· . '11 . ' , • ·-- - 1 . -
.. _(1?) ".C~ver~~ individual" means· any individual., 
ered .u.rider. Chapter _2Q, Public Employees' Benefit' 
insurance Program Act. ' . .. . . . . ' ' 
(16) "Current service" means, covered service as de 
in Chapte~s. 12, q .. r~,~ 1c_5.,J6, t 7;"j~. ·and 19. -- .~ · ·- -
(17) '"Definea ·Jie'nefit" or "definea .benefit plan" or "ci'e-
fined benefit system" means a . system or plan offercii. 
under this title to pr9vide -a specified allowance to"'~ 
retiree or a retiree's spouse after. r~tirement that is.bas · '· 
on a set formula ·involving one br more of the following; .· 
factors: 
,,. . ··ta) §"ears of service; . . 
: Ji · ... ' h: (b?·firi -~Verage· mbi:tthly s~~ary; or 
. ... , (cf'a 'reti ement multiplier. ,, ··: ·-
(18) "Defined. contribution''. ·or "defined contributio 
plan" means any-defined contribution plan or defer.rel!_ . 
compensatibn plan. authorized 'under the Internal ~ ~.' . 
nue Code and aclmi±iistere_d by'-~he_board. . !';~ 
(19) ''Educationa1 _ir.i;;ti~~tiim'..' ·me~s a political subdi~~ .. 
vision or instrumeiitality"".of the state or a combination. -; -
, ,., ~riJi-€~(~;'i!P;f~!Y en/ii.a~~?:hi' educational activi~~s. or th~ , _-
. · ·admiiustrahon or serv1cmg of educational act1V1tles, m,., 
eluding: . · · , · • ' 
· · ·.• . (a) tlie State Board of Educafion and its ins • 
i " ·., mentalities; ' · : · · 
· · Cbl ari'f' l.nstitudhn:: 'or 
branches; . -r. 
(c) any school dist!ict .. and its instrumentalities; · ·:1 . ,· (d) any vocational and technical school; and -
(e) any.entity ·ari.sing·out ·of a consolidation agree-
ment between entities described under this Subsec- -
tion {19). · . 
'(20) (a) "Employer" · mea~ii ; any department, . educa- · 
tional institutioii;--oi- j:i6'1itical subdivision ofthe state , . 
eligible t<i°'particijiate 'in ' a government-sponsored • 
retirei;pent ·system ·uride_j-'.fedetal law. . . , 
i (b) ."EmployEif'1 may ·also include an agency 'fi-
nanced in whole or rn·part by public funds ."· · 
(21) "Exempt employee" ~eans an employee working_ 
for a participatin,g .employer: 
{a) who is not eligible for service . credit under 
Section 49-120203, 49°13-203; 49-14c203, 49,15-203, 
or.49-16-20_3;-and •, .. ,.•,•: ·:c ,. : · 
(b) for whom a participating employer is not re-
... q_uired ~o pay contributions o~ nonelective . contribu• 
., • tions. . . . ! ; . : : , · 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT AND INSURANCE BENEFIT ACT 49-11-201 
•. 
' 
" 
• ~·.1 
(22} "Final average monthly salary" means the amount 
-computed by dividing the compensation received during 
the final average salary period under each system by the 
number of months-in the final average salary period. 
(23) ''Fund" means any fund created under this title for 
the ··purpose of paying benefits or costs of administering a 
·system, plan, or program. 
(24) ·ca) "Inactive member" means ·a memlier who has 
not been employed by a participating employer for a 
period of at,least 120 aays. · . 
(by' "Inactive member" does not include retirees. 
(25) (a) "Member" means . a' person, except Oi1. retiree, 
with contributions on deposit with a syste-/ii; th~'Utah 
Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan under 
Chapter 19, Utah Governors' and Legislato~s' :i;{etire-
ment Act,. or with a terminated syste·m. · ' · · · ·' · 
(b) "Member" also : includes . leased. '•empl~yees 
within the meaning of Section 414(n)(2)'-cif the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, if the employees ·have ) :.ontribu-
tions on deposit with the office. If leased employees 
constitute less tnan 20% of the participating employ-
er's work force that is not highly compensated within 
the meaning of Section 414(n)(5)(c)(°ii); Internal Rev-
enue Code, "member" does not inciiide leased einploy-
e·es covered by a plan described in Section 414(n)(5) of 
the federal Internal Revenue Code. , 
.,· ... , (26) "Member · contributions" means the sum of the 
,· 1·, contributions paid to a system or the Utah Governors' and 
: . Legislators' Retirement Plan, including refund interest if 
: .>( -allowed by a system, and which are made by: · 
!. • !. _ • (a) t_he member; and · ' . 
1
• ·, . , • • (b)' the participating employer on the· member's 
behalf under Section 414(h) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. . 
. _, _(27) "Nonelective contribution" means an amount con-
•,'.: tributed by a participating employer .into a participant's 
' defined contribution account. . · , · 
~~;• (28) "Office" means the Utah State Retirement Office. 
.. . ,, j(29) "I;'articipant" means an individual witp_vo~untary 
·•: deferrals or nonelective contributions on deposit with the 
'·;-,, defined contribution·plans administered under tl:µs title. 
·,. ~ · (30) "Participating employer" means a participating 
: ·" eµiployer, as defined by Chapters 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
; ,; aµd 18, or an agency financed in whole or in part by public 
. · funds wb,ich is participating in a system or pls1.n as of 
•. January 1, 2002. ,. -
· ·,_·: (31) "Pension" means monthly payments _derived from 
· participating employer contributions. . 
• · (32) "Plan" means the Utah Governors' and Legislators' 
. ·Retirement Plan created by Chapter 19, Utah Governors' 
-,and Legislators' Retirement Act, or the defined contribu-
tion plans created under Section 49-11-801. 
• r., _(33) (a) "Political subdivision" means any local govern-
ment entity, including cities, towns;. counties,- and 
school districts, but only if the subdivision is a juristic 
entity that is legally separate and distinct from the 
state and o_nly if its employees are not by virtue of 
their relationship to the entity employees of the state. 
(b) "Political subdivision" includes local dis_tricts, 
special service districts, or authorities created by the 
Legislature or by local governments, including the 
office. 
(c) "Political subdivision" does not include a project 
entity created under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal 
Cooperation Act, that was formed prior to July 1, 
1987. 
·. •. · (34) "Program" means the Public Employees' Insurance 
·'· '. Program created under Chapter 20, Public Erirployees' 
· ;• ~Benefit and Insurance Program Act, or the Public Em-
ployees' Long-Term Disability program created under 
Chapter 21, Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Act. 
(35) "Public funds" means those funds derived, .either 
directly or _indirectly, from public taxes or public revenue, 
dues or contributions. paid or donated_ by the membership 
of the organization, used_ to finance an activ_ity _whose 
objective il? to improve, on a nonp,ofit .bas~s, the govern-
mental, educational, and social programs and systems ,of 
the state or its political subdivisions. . · 
(36) "Qualified·' defined contribution plan" means · a de-
fined contribution plan that meets the requfrements of 
~~t!~n 401(k) or Section __ 403(b) of the Internal Revenue 
· --(37) "Refund interest" means the amount accrued OD 
member contributions . at· a rate adopted by the board. 
· (38) .. "Retiree" means an individual who has qualified 
for ;m allowance under this title. . , _ .'_ ,--·. , _ 
(39) "Retirement" means the status of an individual 
who has become eligible, applies for, and is entitled to 
receive an allowance under· this title. 
(40) "Retirement date" means the date selected .by the 
member on which the member's retirement beccirries ef-
,: foctive )-Vith the office. 
:. (41) "Service credit" means: 
•·· (a) the period during which an employee is em-
ployed and compensated by a participating employer 
and meets the eligibility requirements ·for member-
ship in a system or the Utah Governors' and Legisla-
tors' Retirement Plan, provided that any required 
contributions are paid to the office; and .. 
(b) periods of time .othenvise purchasable under 
· this title. , 
( 42) . '.'System" means the individual retirement systems 
created by Chapter 12, Public Employees' Contributory 
Retirement Act, Chapter 13, Public Employees' N:oncon-
tributory Retirement Act, Chapter 14, Public Safety Con-
tributory Retirement Act, Chapter 15, Public Safety Non-
contributory Retirement Act, Chapter 16, Firefighters' 
" Retirement Act, Chapter 17, Judges' Contributory Retire-
ment Act, Chapter 18, Judges' Noncontributory Retire-
ment ./\ct, and Chapter 19, Utah Governors' and Legisla-
tors' Retire·ment Act. · · · 
(43) "Voluntary deferrals" means an amou.iit'•contrib-
"·uted by a participant into that participant's 'defined con-
tribution account. 2009 
49:11.103. Purpose - Liberal construction . 
(1) The purpose of this title is to establish: 
(a) retirement systems and the Utah Governors' and 
Legislators' Retirement Plan for members which provide: 
(i) a uniform system of membership; · 
(ii) retirement requirements; · 
(iii) benefits for members; . 
(iv) funding ori an actuarially sound basis; 
(v) contributions; and 
(vi) economy and efficiency in public service; 'and 
(b) a central administrative office and a board to ad-
riiirii.ster the various systems, plans, and progr~ms estab-
lished by the Legislature or the board. _ 
' '" .-(2) This title shall be liberally construed to provide mau-
mum benefits and protections consistent with sound fid·uciary 
and actuarial principals. ·· .. 2002 
PART2 
RETmEMENT OFFICE AND BOARD 
49-11-201. Establishment of retirement office - ·An· 
independent state agency - Office e.xemp-
tion. · -, .. , 
1 (1) (a) ,-Tb:ere .is established the Utah State Retirement 
Office, which may also-be known and function as the Utah 
State Retirement Syst'ems. 
• 
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. , (ii). qualified defined contribution plan offered by 
the participating employer if the participating em-
' ployer does not ,. participate in a ,_qualified defined 
. ,,_ . 9ontribution p\an administered by the. board. : 
• ,(c) Not\vithstan~g the prov.isions ofquq;;ecti<;>n (8)(b), 
r . ,. if aJ!- employer, is not. participating in a qualified .defined 
L . co~trib1:1t/im· pfan adininistered by the bpard, the em-
., . . ployer i;na_y elect to pay the contributions to a 11onqualified 
_; deferred comp_1msation pl~ administered by the board: , 
... (9) _f.fotwithst_anding any.ot):ie_r provision of this sec,tion, a 
~ retire!! wqo _has returned· to wor:k, accrued additional service 
1 • credit, and again retires shall have the retiree's al)owanc\) 
: recalculated using: . ., 
' ~ i ·. (a)- the .formula in effect at the date. of the retiree's 
· · original retirement for all service ·credit. accrued prior to 
that date; and · 
.• (b) the formula in effect ·at the date of the subsequent 
i1,,,. · retirement for all senice credit accrued between the first 
and subsequent retirement dates. · 
(10) This· section doe·s· not apply to elei:fed positions. 
-i,;1(11) The board may make rules to implement-this section .. 
? ~M 
PART. 6 .. 
PROCEDURES AND RECORDS 
Payment of employer contributions - Pen-
. al ties for failure to comply - Adjustments to 
•be made. 
~~ff The employer contributions, fees, premium taxes, con-
tribution adjustments, and other required payments• shall be 
. paid to the office by the participiitmg·employer as-determined 
. By the executive director. · ' 
. - Pl' A participating employer th~t fails . to withhold the 
. a'niou.nt of any member contributions, as· soon as· administra:. 
liiely·possible; shall· also pay the member contributions to :tlie 
· of!j:ce out of its own funds . · ·· 
(3)' 'If a participating employer ·does not' make the contribu-
. lions :required by this title within 60 days of the end of the pay 
~od, the participating eri:l.ployifr is liable to the office as 
, , Pfilvided in Section 49-11-604 for: • ·· , · · . · 
~ . · (a) delinquent contributions; . . . . ' 
·~ ·- (b) interest o·n the delinquent contributions as calcu-
. ·. lated under Secti.o'rr 49-11-503·· and , •"; •. ·; 
·2:,: (c)· a 12% per annum pen:aity•on delinquent contribu-
} hons. · . · 
• ).4) The executi~e director may waive all or any part of the 
' lli:erest, penalties, expenses, and fees ifthe executive director 
.,· ~iLi-there were ·extenuiiting 'circumstances surrounding the 
. _)participating employer's failure to comply with thjs section. 
' ·~&) Contributions made 'iii: error will ·be· refunded to the 
~i_cipating employer or member -that ·made·· tlie• 'contribu-
_ti~,:,. .· . ., 2003 
· • -•~-!Liui;. · P~icipating e~ployer to m~tain records 
• ~. :, : - Time• limit::__ Penalties for failure to com-
. ·:: :·! ; ply. . 
. -~Jl) A participating_ employer shall maintain records neces-
_;"~ to :calculate. beniifits unde!<, this title ap.d other records 
, -~ssary for proper administratio:ci.•ofthis title as required by 
. "'e:Qffice. · • 
.I','~)- A participating employer shall maintain the records 
. •. \jq_UU:ed under Subsection (1) until the earliest of: 
. " •. (a) three_ years, after · the date of retirement of the 
, employee from a syste·m or plan;. 
· (b) three years after the date of death of the employee; 
~ " 
K><.;;..,.-..,,(c) 65. years from ' the date of employment with the 
. Participating employer . . 
(3) A participating employer shall be liable to the office for: 
(a) any liabilities and expenses, including· administra-
tive. expenses and· the-cost of increased· benefits to mem-
bers, resulting from the participating employer's failure 
to maintain records-under, this section; and ·: 
(b) a penalty equal to 1 % of the participating employ-
er's last month's contributions. 
(4) 'The -executive director may waive all or any part of the 
interest, pena lties, expenses, and fees if the executive.director 
finds there were extenuating circumstances surrounding·the 
participating employer's failure to comply.with this sectioµ. · 
(5) The executive director may. estimate the length of sera· 
vice, compensation, or age of any member, if that information 
is not contained in the records. · · 2004 
49-li-603. Participating employer to r~po'rt ~l~e;, 
tify _; Time limit - Penalties for. -'fa'ilw-e· to 
comply. · . · .. · •· :· · , 
( i ) As soon as administratively possible, but in no event 
later than. 60 -days _a.fi;er . the .end of each. pay 11eriod, a 
participating employer shall report and certify to thee office: 
(a) the eligibility for service credit _accrual of: , 
(i) a ll current members; 
(ii) each new member as they begin .employment; 
and 
(iii) any changes- to eligibility for service credit 
accrual of each member. 
(b) the compensa tion of each current member eligible 
· for service credit; and . · · . 
. ( c) other factors re la.ting to the 'proper administration 
:of this title as ·required by the executive director. ·: 
(2) Each participating employer shall submit the reports 
required under Subsection (1) in a format approved by the 
office. · 
(3) A participating employer shall be liable to the office for: 
(a) any liabilities and expenses, including administr~7 
-tive expenses and the cost of increased benefits to mem~ 
hers, resulting from the participating employer 's failµr~ 
fo correctly report and certify records under this sectio~; 
(b) a penalty equal to $250 or 50% of the total contri-
butions for the member for the period of the reporting 
error, whichever is greater; and 
,. (c) . attomey fees. · , 
'(4) The executive director may waive all or any part of the 
intei-est;penalties, expenses, and fees if the executive director 
finds there were extenuating circumstances surrounding · tlie 
participating employer's failure to comply with this section. : 
· (5) The executive director may estimate the · 1ength of se'r-
vi'c'e, compensation, or age of any member, if that information 
is not contained in the records. · • 200s 
49-11-604; Office audits of participating employers -
. Penalties for failure to comply. ~ 
(1) (a) The office may perform on-site compliance audits of 
, participating employers· to determine compliance with . 
· · -reporting; contribution, and certification requirements 
under this title. . ' 
(b) The office may request records to be provided by the 
participating employer at the time of the audit. 
(c) -Audits shall be conducted at the·. sole discretion of 
. , the, .. office·: after reasonable notice to the participating 
,j employer. of·at ·least five working days . 
·; (d)., The: participating employer shall extract and pro-
., vide i::ecords· as requested· by the office in an appropriate, 
organized, and usable format. 
· (e) Failure:of a participating employer to allow access; 
prcivide·r!:!cords,,or,.comply in any way with an office audit 
shall result in the participating employer being liable to 
, the office for: 
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, (2) The fund shall consist of all money paid into it, includ-
ing interest, in accordance with this chapter, whether in the 
form of cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money 
received from any other source. 
: .. (3) Custody, management, and investment ofthe ·fund shall 
lie governed by Chapter 11, Utah State Retirement Systems 
Administration. 2002 
l:• 
PART2 
~MBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY 
49-12-201. Sy~tem ,membership - Eligibilitt .; , 
,.,.:q) A regular full-time employee ofa participating'employer 
-.i.;; ,eligible for servic~ credit in this system upon the later of: 
' (a) the date on which the participating employer began 
participating in this system; or . 
· : 0 (b) the effective date of employment of the regular 
full-time employee with the participating employer. 
- ·• (2) Beginning July 1, 1986, a person entering employment 
with the state and its educational institutions may not partic-
ipate in this system. 2002 
.19-12-202. Participation of employers - Limitations -
E:i,clusions - Admission requirements - Ex-
ceptions - Nondiscrimination requirements. 
• (.1) (a) Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an employer 
is a participating employer and may not. withdraw from 
participation in this system. 
(b) In addition to their participation in this system, 
,;: :•·participating employers may provide or participate in 
public or private retirement, supplemental or defined 
contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for their 
employees: 
(2) The following employers may be excluded from partici-
pation in this system: 
(a) an employer not initially·admitted or included as a 
participating employer in this system prior to January 1, 
1982 if: ' 
· (i) the employer elects not·tq provide or participate 
in ·any type of private oi' pµblii: retirement, supple-
mental or defuied contribution plan, either directly or 
in,directly, for its. employees, except for Social Secu-
rity· or · · •· .• · •· ' ·. . 1 '· 1 
(ii) the· employer offers another collecti~ely bar-
gained reJ;irement benefit an.d has continued to do so 
cin an uninterrupted basis since that date; 
(b) an employer that is a charter school sponsored by 
the State Board of Education or a: school district that 
· makes an election of non participation in accordance with 
Section 53A-la-512 unless the charte·r · school makes a 
one-time, irrevocable retraction of the election of nonpar-
ticipation in accordance with Subsection 53A-la-512(9); 
or . 
(cl' ' an employer that is a hospital created as a special 
service district under Title 17D, Chapter 1, Special Ser-
vice District Act, that makes an' election of nonparticipa-
tion in accordance w:ith Subsection (4). · 
(3) An' employer who did not become . a· piirticipating em-
ployer in this system prior to July 1, 1986, may not participate 
in this system. . . . . . . 
(4) (a) Until J une 30, 2009, a employei: that is'a hospital 
. . created . as a special service district under Title 17D, 
Chapter· r, Special Service District Act, may make ~n 
.. election ofnonparticil}ation as an employer for retir"e .. n:i8ni 
programs under this chapter. 
(b) An election provided .under Subsection (4)(a): 
(i) is a one0 time election i:nade no later than the 
time specified under Subsection (4)(a); 
(ii) shall_ be docU!llentecl by a. resolut_ion a_dopted QJI 
the govt;rrung body of the special service district· 
(iii) is' irr;vocable; and . ·"-· . ' 
(iv) applies to the special servic~ ,cjistrict <!S the 
~~R.!?1er an~_.to all employees of t~_e· sp~cial service : .. -
distnct. · . · , 
'·'' ·- (c) The governing body· of the special' s~ivice disf:tic;t ' ; : '" 
may offer employee benefit plans .for its employees: ., ·•·. 
(i) ·under Title 49, Chapter 20, Public Empl~Jeea' 
. , , ·: . Bene~t;![!nd Insuranc!J Progr~ Act; or · 
.. •. (ii) unde.r any other program. .• 
, (5) Yr 'a · paJ:'.ticipating-emplqyer, p~:rchases service credit on 
.~eha!f of , ~gu.\!J,r _fulhti,me-e.~ployees for s~!'Yice rendered 
prior to the participating employer's·admission to this system 
the service credit shall be purchase5,1 in a nondiscriminatory 
manner on behalf 9( iill current and f9rmer regular full-time 
empl!JY!!~~ who . }\'.ere eligible for service credit at the time 
lien-Jc~ ~llil re!)dered. . . , · · . ::, 2009 
·,{9 • .1::i-2/ii . Exclusidri~ from membership in system. 
· ·'(i) ·The · foi.l'o~ing employees, are not •~Jigibie for service 
creditin this system: .. · . . . ., 
·, . ,, · · ·(af An; e!Jlployee whose employment status is tempo- ~· 
rary in .nature due to the nature or the type of work to be 
performed, provided 'that: ,,., . 
(i) .if the -.term of employment exceeds six months 
EJJ?.d.,Jh.e. employee 9th~i_-w-ise· qualifies for service 
credit in this system, the participaJL!).g employer shall 
report; :and certify ·to th!'l,_o.flice that the employee is a 
regular full-time employee effective the beginning of 
the seventh month of employment;:or 
(ii) if an employee, p_reviously terminated prior to 
being· eligible for ser-vice credit in ,this system is 
reemployed within .three•:mpnths of termination by 
the. same psJ.rticipating .employer, the p!frtiCipating 
employer shall report·imihertify that·the member is 
a regular full-time employee:when°the total of the 
periotls of:, employment equals six months and the 
·~ employee otherwise qualifies for service credit in this 
system.• ... -, 
(b) (i) A-current or future employee ·of a two-year or 
four-year .college or university who holds, or is enti-
tled· to hold,. under, Section.49-12s204, a retirement 
annuity •contract' •with the Teachers' Insurance and 
Annuity Association of America or· with any other 
public or private system, organization, or company 
· during a.n:y:'-period in which :>requiriid contributions 
based on ·compe·nsation have' been paid on ·behalf of -
the employee ·by 'the·employer. · , ,.,,, 
(ii) The employee, upon cessation of the· participat-
ing employer 'contributions, shall •immediately be-
come eligiole for service credit .in this system,, · 
(c) An employee serving as an exchange employee from 
outside the state. . ' : 
·.• (d) An executive department head of the state, a mem-
ber of the· State Tax Commission, the Public Service 
Commission, and a member of a full-time or part-time 
·' · board or com.mission who files a formal request for exemp-
,- tion. - '· 
· , (e) An employee of the Department of Workforce Ser-
· vices who is covered under 'another ·retirement !>YStem 
allowed under Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Secu-
rity Act .• ~ ; · · 
· (f) (i) An employee who is employed on or after July 1, 
., 2009 with an employer that has elected, prior to July 
1, 2009, to be excluded from participation in this 
system under Subsection 49-12-202(2)(c). 
(ii) Notwithstanding the provisions of this ·subsec-
tion (l)(f), any eligibility for service credit earned by 
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an employee under this chapter before July 1, 2009 is 
not affected under this Subsection ( l )(f). · · 
(2) Upon filing a written request .for "exemption . with the 
office, the' following employees shall be exempt frcim'. coverage 
·under this system:··· - · - ,; ,, ... . , 'i .. '· 
. (a)· a full-time student or the·- spolise oF ·a ful! '.fime 
student and· individuals emplo.yed in a trainee relation~ 
ship'-- · -, .-,.,., , ., •,•. 
~.. • :• (b) an elected Official;-: 
(cl an executive 'department head of the state, a mem-
ber of the State Tax Conim.ission, a member of th"ii Public 
Service Cciinmission, and a member' · of ' a fuH~tiirie or 
· part-time board or commission; ._ .. 
. (d) an employee of the Governor's Offi~e ,of Planning 
and Budget; · _ _ :· 
:· ; : . (e) an employee of the Go.:rerrior's Office of Eco'.aomic 
'.'''-'. Development; - .. · . ·. . · .·· · . . '_': 
• (f) an employee of the Commission on Criminfil and 
Juvenile Justice; · _· ' . ·, -•. , -, : _/ 
(g) an employee of the Governor's Office; ., 
(h) an employee. of the Sta~e. Auditor's Office; , 
(i) an emplpyee .of the State.Treasurez;'s Office; _ 
(j) any other member whii is permitt_ed to ·make an 
election under Section 49-11-406; : . - .. ' 
.. (kl a person appointed as a city manager or chief city 
· i ,.' administrator or another person employed by a miµiici-
. .:, . pality, county, or o~_hei; : political subdivision, whojs an 
• 51'. 1 • ~t-will. employee; and . , . . 
· ... (I) an employee. of an interlocal cooperative agency 
.. _ , created under Title .11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooperation 
• ' ;_,,. Act, who is engaged in_ a specialized trade customarily 
• _ ', .. ~;, provided through membership· in a labor organi~ation 
. • :;:.:°' that provides retirement benefits to its members. . 
".: J1· (3); (a) Each participating employer shall prepare a list 
~i · designating those positions eligible for exemption under 
.,. /,J,~·, Subsection (2). ·. • - _ ._ _. --·. · .- i;c·--· . 
•• ~ j ~, (b) 'An .employee may not be_ exempted unle'.ss the 
. - ::,; ·.employee is employed in a -position designated ,by. the 
. ,. .-. ,;•,-participating employer. · . . 
, ::-,,l4) (a) In accordance with this section, a - municipality; 
-,,._:_~aunty, or political subdivision may not exempt more than 
•. ;l;•i, 50 positions or a number equ~ ta 10% of the employees of 
"'sY,, tlie-municipality, county, or political subdivision which-
.. ;";,•,a ever is· lesser., . . . . · .. , . .. , . , : 
· · 'f)'· '" {b) A municipality, county, or political subdivision may 
1f:.. exempt at least one regular full-time employ,ee. 
. (5) Each participating employer shall: : . ,~ . , 
. (a) file employee exemptions annually \vith the office; 
' ,and · . · . , . , 
, •· ·a,)' (b) updat.e the employee exemptions in the e_vent of any 
· ·Aro change. :. ,, , ,; ,:,, ' 
:_ •~i (6) The _office may make ntles to implement this section. 
• ·';. •i ·. 2009 
• ;:1c9}2-204. Higher ~ducati~n employe~s• 'eligibil.i~ re-
. · · · · quirements· ~ Election betwee_n different re-
. tireme:iJ.t plans -: Cliissific,i~ion re,ci.u.irements 
__ _ _ i,.~~sf.~{h7~ ·ee,ii sy_.stenis / - Stii:ii>Ieqi~iitaI 
, i: r: . plans ·ip,lthonzed. , . . , . . 
;J . (1) (a) Regufai full-time employees 9f institutians.~f,higher 
.. ·.,);," . education who ,are eligible to participate in eitµer · this 
.. - system or in a:-:retirement annuity · contract \vith the 
. ),/! ':l'eachei;s' Insurance and Annuity Ass~ciatian of A.i:netjca 
. ~ -~ or with any other pub,lic or private systeqi, organiz.a.(10~, 
; ,· , - or company, designated by the Board of Regents, shall, ·n9t 
"!'- •• ,,_ later than January 1, 1979, elect to participate i:ix9li.is~vely 
· : . in this system or in an annuity contract allowed under 
••.• this Subsection (1) ' · ·.; • · - , · .. : ' ·:', .. _:- '· :··· 
• .<! l i: : (b) · The-election is lina'i, ~d ~a right ~ris~ to niak~~ ~~ 
'" further election. ·. · i · .. , ;, '· ' · ·. · · ,. ,,, .. 
(2) (a) A regular full-time ·employee hired by an institution 
. of higher education after January 1, 1979, may partici-
' .,- ,· pate only in the retirement plan which· attaches to the 
person's employment classification. 
. ' :, · (b).- Each institution of higher education shall prepare 
· :·, or amend existing employment classifications, under the 
direction of the Board of Regents, so that each classifica-
tion is assigned with either:. , 
(i) this system; · 
(ii) the Teachers,' -Ins_urance ,and Annuity Associa-
tion of America; or 
·', •(iii)- another· .public ·.ai; · private : system, organiza-
tion, or company designated by the-Board of Regents . 
0 ,, (3) A ·regular-full-time ·employee hired by an institution of 
higher education after January 1, 1979, whose employment 
classification requires participation, in this system inay elect 
to continue ·participation in this system upon change: to an 
employment classification which requires participation in:-
, , :·.' (a) an. annuity plan with th·e Teachers', Insurance and -
Annuity-Association of America; or · 
(b) another public or private system, organization, or 
company· designated by the Board of Regents. 
(4) A regular full-time employee hired by an institution of 
higher ,education after January· 1, 1979, whose employment 
classifica'tiah requires participation· in this system shall par-
ticipate in this system. : ' · 2002 
P.ART3 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
; 
49-12-301, : Contribut~ons -Two levE!ls - Ele~tion by a 
participating employer to Pl!-Y employee con-
tributions - Accounting for and vesting of 
member contributions - Deductions. 
. ( l)):'arj;icip,atipg,employers and members shall jointly pay 
tlie -ser.tiped. <;on.tribution rates to the office ta, maintain this 
sys_tem on a financially and actuarially sound basis . 
(2) Far purposes of determining contribution rates, this 
systeriia is divided into· two levels according t<i' paiticipa ti.ng 
employers as, fallows: 
(a) Level A includes the state, its independent agencies, 
indepenae·rit entities, · public~corparatians, and othet in-
•strilinentalities, ... all participating educational institu-
tions, and all ather ·pamcipating employers whose,activ• 
ities are associated with·: participating _ educational 
institutions. · 
(b) Level B includes all other participating employers 
in this system. ·, ,, 
. • ('3), (a) A participating employer may elect ta pay all or part · 
• ,of the -required member contributions, in addition.to the 
required participating employer contributions. 
! :,;'t . (b);i Any amount' contributed by a participating em-
ployer . UI\der this sectiqn shall vest to the membe'r's 
· ' benefit as though the member had made'the contribution . 
(c) The required member contributions shall be re-
: dticed by the amount that is paid: by the participating 
. · , . employer. 
(41 :(a) All inember contributions are credited-- by-the office 
ta the account of the individual member . 
· ~ ,' · (bl'.·This am·aunt, together with refund interest, is held 
· , ,, in, trust.for the payment of benefits to the member or the 
· member's 'beneficiaries. ·. - : ,, .. · . . ·{: -
(c) All·member contributions are vested and nonfarfeit-
able: 
,., (5},•(aJ··Each member is considered to consent ta payroll 
deductions of member contributions. 
(b) The payment of compensation less these payroll 
deductions is considered full payment for services ren-
dered by the member. : ·' < · · 2002 
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per week or more for a participating employer, 
regardless of benefits provided; · 
(iii) an officer, elective or appointive, who 
earns during the first fl!IL month of the term of 
office $500 or more, indexed as of January 1, 
1990, as provided in Se~tion 49~13-407; .-
, (iv) a faculty member or employee ofan insti-
tution of higher education who is considered 
full-ti.me by that institution of higher education; 
and- ··. , ,, 
(v) an individual who otherwise meets the 
; :• definition of this Subsection (4) who · performs 
services for a· participating employer through a 
professional employer organization ·or · similar 
arrangement, 
(5) "System" means· the Public Employees' Noncontrib-
utory Retirement System. 
, (6), -"Years of service credit~ means: 
(a} a period, consisting of 12 full months as.deter-
mined by the board; 
{b) a :period • determined .by the ,. board, ,,vhether 
consecutive or not, during which a regular full-time 
-employee performed services for a participating em-
ployer, including any. time the regular full-time em-
ployee.was ab~ent on a paid leave of..ab!,!ence granted 
by 'a participating employer or was· absenLin the 
service of the. United States· government oni military 
duty as provided by this chapter; or · 
fo) · the regular school year con'sisting' of not less 
than eight months of filll-time service for a regular 
full-time employee of an educational institution. 
2008 
.4~•1?-103 . . Creation of system. , , 
'• · • ~er!! i~ created for members_ employed by a partic!pating 
·employer the "Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement 
S,i,_st~m." 2002 
;: .,,. . 
9-13-104. Creation of trust fwi.d. . 
--Al. 'l)iere is created the ''Public ~_mployees' Nonc~ntribu-
. • ;52~ Re~i.iement Trust Fund" for the purpo:5e of paying the 
' :'OeJle,fi~ _ a,nd costs of admi!listering this system. ., ; . 
• ..,i;m .T~e fund shall consist of all money paid into it, in,clud-
ll)g interest, in accordance with this chapter, whether in the 
f0!}D. of-cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money 
.. :received from any other source. . . 
- (3) Custody, management, and investment of the fund s!'iall 
•• 1~ ,gov~rned by Chapter 11, Utah State Retirement s,ystems 
~stration. 2002 
::·,' 
PART2 
MEMBERSillP ELIGIBILITY 
· 49-13-201.. · System ~~bership..,,. Eligibility. . · · : 
~ (l!.J Beginning July· I, ~rn86, the state and ;its educational 
, ~tutions shall participate in this sy~tem., 
(a) A person entering regular full-time employment 
- • wi~h the· state-orits. educational institutions, after: July .1, 
-- _ 1986, is eligible for service credit in·. this system. : • 
'!+, (b) A regular full-time employee .of the state or its 
:_ -educational institutions prior to July 1, 1986, may either 
· -- ~ecome eligible for service credit in this system'or remain 
·.-. eligible for service in the system established· under Chap-
tei; 12, Public Employees' Contributory Retirement Act, by 
afoUowing the procedures establis hed ,by: the,:'boa.i-d in 
accordance with this chapter. · ·:' .,: .:, 
. ~2.J • An employer, other than the state and its. educational 
:~titutions; may participate in this system except, that. once 
an employer elects to participate in this system, that election 
is irrevocable. · 
(a) A person entering regular full-time ·employment 
with a participating employer which elects to participate 
in: this system is eligible for service credit in this system. 
(b) A person. in regular full-time employment with a 
· participating employer prior to the participating employ-
er's election to ' participate in this system may either 
become eligible for service credit in this system or remain 
eligible for service in th~ system established under Chap-
ter 12, Public Employees' Contributory'RetirementAct, by 
folfchving the procedures established by the · board in 
accordance witli this chapter. ' 2002 
• '; :. . j , , - ·, l a : , ~ , 
49-13'-202. ·Participation of employers - Limitations-
•." '. Exclusions · - Admission requirements·· ,;_ 
l Noridiscriniination . requirements - . Service 
credit purchases. ' 
(1) (a) ,Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an employer 
is. a participating employer and may not 1rithdraw from 
participation in this system. ' · ' .. , . 
.(b) ln addition. to their participation in this system, 
participating employers may provide or participate in any 
additional public or private retirement, supplemental or 
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for 
t~eir employees. . ; 
(2) The following employers may be excluded from partici-
pation in this system: 
(a) an employer not initially admitted or included as a 
participating employer in this system prior to January 1, 
~982 if: 
(i) the employer elects not to provide or participate 
in any type of private or public retirement, supple-
mental or defined contribution plan, either directly or 
indirectly, for its employees, except for Social Secu-
rity; or 
. (ii} the employer offers another collectively bar-
gained retirement benefit and has continued to do so 
on an uninterrupted basis:since that date; 
(b) an employer that is· a charter school sponsored by 
•, • : ·the State Board of Education or a school district that 
· makes ·an election of nonparticipation in accordance with 
. Sectioll' 53A-la-512 unless the charter school makes a 
•one·-time, irrevocable retraction of the election of nonpar-
ticipation in accordance with Subsection 53A-la-512(9); 
or 
(c) an employer that is a hospital created as a special 
service district under Title 17D, Chapter 1, Special Ser- · 
.. vice District Act, that makes an election of nonparticipa-
·: : tion in accordance with Subsection (5). · 
(3) If an employer that· may be excluded under Subsection 
f2)(a)(i) elects at any time to provide or participate in any type 
of public or private retirement, supplemental or defined con-
tribution pl!ll, either directly. or indirectly, except for Social 
Security, the employer shall be a participating employer in 
this system. 
J. (4) (a) An employer may, by resolution of its governing 
: body, apply for admission to this system. 
(b) Upon approval of the resolution by the board, the 
0
'· employer is a participating employer in this system and is 
~ · -. subject to this title. 
(5) (a)· Until June 30, 2009, a employer that is a hospital 
created as a special service district Ullder Title 17D, 
Chapter· 1,, Special Service District Act, may make an 
election of non participation as an employer for retirement 
programs under this chapter. 
(b) An election provided under Subsectio.n (5)(a): 
(i) is a one-time election made no later than the 
time specified under Subsection (5)(a}; 
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.:~· ; (ii) shall be documented by a resolution adopted·by 
the governing body of the special service district;' . 
(iii) . is irrevocable; and . 
(iv) applies to the special servi<:e district as the 
, employer and to all employees of the special service i, district.. . . • . 
(c) ,The governing body of the special sen,;ce district 
may·offer employee benefit plans for its employee~: .. 
·t (i) under Title 49, Chapter 20, .Public Employees' 
Benefit and Insurance· Program Act; or 
(ii) under any other program. , 
. (6) If a participating employer purchases service ·~~e.dit on 
,b.!!half of regular full-time employees for · service rendered 
prior to the participating employer's admission to this system, 
the service credit shall be purchased in a nondfacriminatqry 
.manner on behalf of all current and former regular full-time 
,e~ployees w~o were eligibl~ for sen,;ce credit at the time 
service was rendered. 2009 
49-13-203. Exclusions from. memb~rship in system. 
(1) . The following employees are not 'eligible for service 
credit in this system: · 
· (a) An employee whose employment status is tempo-
rary in. nature due to the nature or the type of work to be 
:. : Gpei-fqrmed, proviaed that: . '_.. 
' '.·'·,-:-,!. (i) ·;r tlie· term of employment exceeds· six months 
and the employee otherwise qualifies for : service 
· cr~ilit in this-system, the'participating employer shall 
report and certify to the office that•the ·employee is a 
regular full itime employee effective lhe beginning of 
• • the 'seventh~month of employment; ·and 
(ii) if an employee, previously terminated prior to 
becomiiig •eligible for service er.edit in this system, is 
reemployed ,vithin three months of termination by 
the .same ·participating: employer, . the ,participating 
employer.shall report and certify to the·office that the 
member is a regular full-time employee when the 
i. total of the periods of empl_oyment equals six months 
I ·:. ::and .the employee · otherwise qualifies · fQr service 
credit iri thiK system. ~ r, 
. (b) .(i) A current or fu ture employee•·of a two-year or 
. , , , ,: . four-yeao,college or university who holds, or is · enti-
tled to hold, under Section 49.--13-204; a retirement 
annuity contract,-with -the Teachers' Insurance and 
.Annuity .. Assodation of. America or with. any ·other 
pub1ic or.:pri'lil.te system, · organization, or company 
during any period in which required contributions 
based -on compens·ation have been paid on .behalf of 
-1.,;.: . tjie employee.by.the employer: ,, · •, ,,, ;- .•. 
(ii) The employee,Jipon cessation of thejiarticipat-
ing employei:. contributions,, shall immediately be-
. come eligible .for service credit' in this system. : : ... 
(c) An e:i;nploye_e serving as an exchange employee from 
outside the state. ·. 1 1 c'.- ~ 
·', (d) An executive department. ·head of the state ·or a 
. l~g'islative •director, -senior :executive employed by the 
governor's office, a member of the State Tax Commission, 
a member of the Public Service ~ommission, and a 
member of a full~time. or .part-time board or commission 
;.vho -files a formal request for exempti!)n.• 
, . (e) An employee of the Department of Workforce Ser-
vices who is covered under another retirement,.' system 
·, _allowed under Titl~ 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Secu-
- rityAct. , : . . .. ,. 
(f) (i) An employee who is employed .on or.after July 1, 
2009 with·an employer that has elected, prior to July 
1, 2009, to be excluded from participation in this 
system under Subsection 49-13-202{2)(c). . : 
(ii) Notwithstanding the provisions of tMs Subsec-
tion (l)(f), any eligibility for service credit-earned by 
, . . a'! emp)oyee.upder.this .chapter before July 1, 2009 is 
not affected under. this Subsection (l)(f). • 
• , (2) Upon ~ling a written request for exemption with the 
· office, the· following employees shall be exempt .from coverage 
under this system: 
(a) ; a full-time · student .or . the spouse of a full-time 
; . •: student .a,nd individuals employed· in a trainee relation: ·• 
: -·, .. ship;~ · , .. :: .... ,,·, ,.,. · 
(b) an elected official; · :·::.;! 
(c) an executive department bead of the state, a mem-· 
ber of the State Tax Commissfon;'a .member of the Public 
-,. :,·, Service; Commission, and. ·a member of a full-time or 
!'" part"time. bqard oricommission; ·· , ,, 
,,.i,c (d)·, an •,employee of the Governor's Office of Planning 
and Budget; · · · . 
-•·i :·,1r,. (e):!an, ei:qployee of.the Govemor's Office ·or Economic . 
Development; 
(f) an employee of the Co=ission on Criminal and 
.. Juvenile Justice; 
(g) an employee of the Governor's . Office; , •. ,. 
· (h) an employee:of the.·State Auditor 's Office; 
· (i) an employee of the State Treasurer's Office; 
_ (j) _any other member. who is permitted·,to,,make an 
-•· ·. election under Section 49-11-40$; : 
!", ' . . ,; ,-.(k) ,,a ,person appointed as. a' city manager .. or chief city , ,_ 
--, .administrator. oraanother person. employed by a munici- · . 
.· ' · pality;• county,;:oL.other political subdivision, who is an _ 
at-will employee;-and . 
m an ·employee of. an interl<ic:µ cooperative agency ~ 
·:'" created underTitle-11, Chapter 13,Intei:local.Cooperation 
Act, .,w,ho .is. engaged in a speci!ilized trade customarily • 
,.::· ,. provided through membership in a labor organization 
that provides retirement benefits to its members. 
(3) (a) Each· P.articipating employer .shall . prepare a' _list 
,::. designating'tl:uise positions eligibl!! for·'1i_*einp.tion under · · 
· •~•;•Subsection7{2);r - . ._ ,·! .. ;,·; "u- - · 
(b) An employee may not be e.xempted unless · tli'e 
employee is employed in · a position designated by the 
. participating employer. · , · -
'· .. (4)' (a)' hi· accordance with .this s~ction; a municipality, 
'' · ·couiity, or political subdivision may·not exempt riiiire thru_i 
50 p9sitions-or a number·equal,'to10% of the employees of 
· ·:the ·I!lunicipality, county, or political subdivision, which-
. iiver'ls lesser. . 
•,·1 (b) A municipality, county; or political subdivision may 
exempt at least one regular full-time employee. · ·, . 
(5) ''Eilch participating e·mploy1fr· shall: · · _ 
· ,,.,•. '• (a)!'file employee exemptions annually with the office; 
,., .. .. . and . . ' · ··· 
(b) update the employee exemptions in the event of any 
change. . . 
(6) The office may make rules to implement this section. 
- . 200D 
49-13-204. Higher .education employees' eligibility re-
quirements - .Election bej;ween different re· 
tirement plans - .Classification requirements 
·- Transfer.between systems. 
' (-1) '. (a). Regular full-time employees of institutions of higher 
education .who are eligible .to participate' i.n.:either this 
·-system or: in a ,.retir,ement annuity c·ontract with the 
- .:Teachers'. Insurailc·e and Annuity Association of America 
· or with any other. public or private-system; or.ganization, 
or company, designated. by the Board of Regents, shall, not 
later than January l, 1979, elect to participate exclusively 
.. in this •systeni or in an anmrity contract allowed under 
this Subsection (l)(a). .· , 
(b). The election is final , and no right exists to make any 
further: election. 
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63G-7;302 GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
.-! '. ·: 1 •• ·, ·(i} the trail is designated under a general plan 
adopted by a municipality under Section 10-9a-401 or 
by· a··i:ounty under 'Sectiori 17 :27 a-401; 
(ii) the trail right-of-way or the right0ofaway where 
the trail is located is .open to p·ublic use as evidenced 
by a written agreement between the owner or opera-
tor of the trail right-of-way, or of the right-of-way 
where the trail is located; and the municipality or 
county where the trail is located; and 
1, , n,.,ur·• , • . (iii) the written agreement: 
.:s: ' , ,1 . (A) contains a plan for operation and mainte-
nance of the trail; and · 
(B) provides that an owner or operator of the 
trail right-of-way or of the right:of-way where the 
trail is located has, at minimuIJ?., tlie same level 
of immunity from suit as the governmental en-
tity in connection with or resulting from the use 
of the trail. . · 
.(o) rese~i-ch or implementation of cloud manag~ment 
or seeding for the clearing of fog; . · 
(p) the management of flood waters, ·earthquakes, or 
natural disasters; · · 
(q) the construction, repair, or operat\on of flood oi: 
storm syi,tems; · · 
· · (r) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
"' : driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 
41-6a-212• I • 
(s) the ~ctivities of; . 
(i) 'prov1cling emergency medical assistance; '' 
(ii) fighting fire; . . . 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
· materials or hazardous wastes; 
. (iv) 'emergency evacuations; . 
(y) transporting or removing injured"p·ersons to a 
plac·e where emergency medical assistance can be 
rendered 'or where the person can be transported by a 
licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
· (t) the exercise or performance, or the failure to ·exer-
//~ cise_ o~J?~t1'orm; ~Ily fun~t~on pursuant to ~tle 73: Chap• 
· ; :ter 10,'·Board · of Water Resources ~ Division cif Water 
. Resources; or 
,, ·(ti) unauthorized access to ·government records·, data, 
or electronic information systems by any person or ·entity. 
. •::, ;· ; :· . . , . 2008 
63G-7-302. Specific remedies ·~ ''Takings" actions -
Government' · Records Access and Manage-
ment Actions. , 
. !: (1) In any action brought under the authority• of Article I, 
Section 22, of the U tab Constitution for the recovery of 
compensation from the ·goveriimental entitywhen the govern-
mental entity has taken o~ · damaged· private prope·rty for 
public uses ·without 1ust -cornpensation, comp'erisation and 
damages shall be assessed according to the· requirements of 
Title 78B; Chapter 6, Part 5, Emin·ent,Domain . ·· 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding · Section : 63G-7-401, · a . notice of 
: .. claim for attorney fees under Subsection 63G-7-301(2)(e) 
may be filed contemporaneously .with a petition for review 
under Sedion·63G-2-404. · 
(b) The provisions of Subsection 63G-7-403(1), relating 
to the governmental entity's response to· a:claim; and the 
provisions of Section 63G-7-601, requiring ·an ·undertak-
. :ing, do•not apply to a notice of claim for attorney .fees filed 
,•conternporaneously ·with a petition for review under Sec-
tion 63G-2-404. · 
(c) Any other claim under this chapter that is related .to 
a ·claim for attorney fees . under Subsection: , 63G-7-
·:,, 301(2)(e) may be -brought contemporaneously with the 
claim for attorney fees or in a subsequent action. 2008 
PART4 · · 
NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A GOVE,u.t,mN:N'n> 
ENTITY OR A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE ~ , 
63G:7~40~- Claim fo~ injury ~ Notice - Conten 
.. , · Service -:.Legal disability ...:.. Appointrne!t• 
guar~ian :11d )item. · 
(l) (a) Except_. as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a 
, ,.· arises when the statute of liµi.it;:itions that would ap I it: 
the claim were against a private person begins to ~ · 
. · (b) The statute of limitations does not begin to 
,•.• ;• until ;i. claimant knew, or with the exercise ofreaacinahJe 
dil\gence should have known: · ;,. ·· -
(i) that the claimant· had a claim against th;.gov. ' 
•:,, ernmental entity or its employee; and ., •' 
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or-
name of the employee. . . .. " 
,, .;, (~) The burden to prove the exercise of r~as~~iihle 
diligence is upon the claimant. . · "I:' 
(2) Any person· having a claim against a governmen: . 
enti_ty, or against _its employee for an act o,r omission occ:urnng:.:. .; . .'. 
dunng the ~erformance of.the employees duties, within·. t~ ... · ~ 
scope of_ employment, or under color of authonty shall file a . ,~; 
writtE!n' notice of claim with the entity before maintaining ail.' , · .. 
action;· regardless of whether or not the function giving rise ·tol ·•. 
the ;claimis characterized as governmental. . •: .·, 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a:brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; · • . 
(iii) the damages iri'~ii~ed by the claimant so far·as 
they are. known; .and · . 
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a govern-
.mental ,employee individually as provided in Si.tosw . • , 
· tion:.63G-7°202(3)(c), the name of the employee. ;1_ • •· 
(h) The notice of claim shall be:. · . . · . . ,, , ' 
·,,, •(i)' :signed by the person making 'the claim or that ,:.,_-
. . person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian· .t" · 
and: ' ·.> 
. (ii) directed and ·idellvered by .hand or by mail ' 
according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to •'"' · 
the office of: 
. · ··· (A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is . ' 
1 , · against ail' incorporated city or town; 
·· .·(B) the county clerk\7when the claim is against · 
a county; . . - :'• · 
(C) the .superintendent or business adminia- \· 
trator .of the }loard, when the claim is against a · . • · 
•< • school ·district or board of education; •· • 
• (D) ·the .presiding ofiker• pr··secretary/clerk of ·' 
the · board; ,.when the claim 'is against a local ,· · 
district-or special service district;·.· '· 
(E) the ;attorney ·general, when the claim is • 
· 
11 • • against the ·state; ,·• 
· {F) . a -member· of . the governing· board, the 
executive director, or exec.utive secretary, when 
the claim is · against any ·other · public · board, 
co=ission, or body; or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental 
·.entity to receive the:notice of claim by° the gov-
ern.mental enlity under·Subsection (5)(e): . · 
(4) (a) If an injury that ·may reason'ably be expected to • 
·result . in a ':claim against · a governmental entity'. is sus-
. .tained ··by ·a ~laimant who is under the age of majority or 
·mentally-incompetent, that governmental eritity may file 
1 ·a re°t'iuest with the court for'the appoin'tment of a-·guardian 
ad litem for the potential claimant. · 
(h) If ' a guardian ad !item ·is appointed, the time for 
filing a claim under Section 63G-7-<102 begins· when the 
order appointing the guardian is issued. 
(: 
. GENERAL GOVERNlVIENT 63G-7-603 
, (5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this 
chapter shall file a statement with the Division of Corpo-
rations and Commercial Code within the Departrµent of 
Commerce containing: .· 
(i) the name and address of the governmental 
entity; 
(ii) the office or ageni designated to recefve a notice 
of claim; and · 
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and 
'delivered. .. _ , .. 
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its state-
ment as necessary to ensure that the information is 
accurate. · 
(c) The Diyision of Corporations and Commercial Code 
shall develop a form for governmental entities to complete 
that provides the information required by Subsection 
(5l(a). · · · ,: ; 
I (d) (i) A newly incorporated muni'i:ipality shall file the 
statement required by Subsecl:fon (5)(a) ·pr·omptly 
after the lieutenant governor issues a certiffoate or 
incorporation under Section 67-la-6.5. 
(ii) ·A newly incorporated local district shall file the 
statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time 
that the written notice is filed ,v"ith the lieutenant 
governor under Section 17B-1-215. 
(el A governmental entity may, in its statement, iden-
, tify an•~gent authorized by the entity to accept notices of 
t claim on· its -beh'a:lf. ' --,. · · 
(6) The Di'vision of Corporations and· Com.mercia_l · Code 
·~ . 
- •· • (a) maintain an index of the statements require_d by 
;., this sectioh arranged both alphabetically by entity and by 
county of operation; and 
• (b) make the indices ·available to the public both elec-
tronically and via hard copy. ·,; 
(,7.) A governmental entity may-not.challenge the validity of 
a:notice of claim on the. grouods·.that .it was .not directed and 
lhlivered to the proper office or-·agent if the error is caused by 
ithe ·governmental' entity's, failure to file or update the: state-
" lllent required by Subsection (5). . ·1·2009 
-. . 
. llaG-7-402. Time for filing notice of cla~~ . . , 
. A claim against a governmental entity, or against an em-
yee for an·_act qr:-om.ission: occurring during the pe1formahce 
lffithe employee's duties, 1vithin the scope of employment, or 
. <l).nder color ofauthority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
With. the person and according to the requirements .of Section 
§SG..7.401 within one year after the claim arises regardless-of 
ether or not the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
i· · · ed as govern.mental. . .,:, 2008 
·~ .. . 
•. ,<}f4(j3_ Notice of claim - Approval or denial by 
·• governmental entity or insurance carrier 
~ . ! r-, ·•,_. . wit_hin 60 days. _77 Remedies for de_nial of 
. ,. claim.. . . ' I ~ • - • .~ • • r· r• • 
• : (l)_ (a) Within 60 days of the filing ofa notice of~)!!-i.IT4 the 
." governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall .inform 
· ··,the claimant-in writing that ttie claim, has either" lieen 
, pproved or denied. ~ 
· (b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at· the end of 
the 60-day period, the governmental entity or, its 'insur-
ance c:;trrier has failed to· approve or deny the claim. .,. 
~). {a) lf the claim. is denied, a claimant may institute an 
actiqn in the , di~trict courtr-against the governmental 
entity or-arr. e.mplo;yee of the 'entity. . · 
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year 
after "denial of the claim or within one year after the 
-~eni;il period specified in this chapter has expired·; regard-
less of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim 
1s characterized as governmental. 200s 
PART6 
LEGAL ACTIONS UNDER TffiS CHAPTER -
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
63G-7-501. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions. 
( l )' The district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction 
over any action brought under this chapter. · 
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried 
as· a small claims action. 2008 
63G-7-502. Venue of actions. 
(1) Actions against the state may be brought in the county 
in which the claim arose. Of in Salt Lak~ County. 
(2) (a). Actions against a . county may be · brought iri the 
county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant 
county; or; upon leave.granted by a district court judge of 
the defendant county, in any county 'contiguous to the 
defendant county. 
(bl Leave may be granted ex parte. 
(3) Actions . against all other political subdivisions,' includ-
ing cities and towns, sha.U be brought in the cqunty in• which 
the political subdivision is located or in the county in which 
the claim arose. ,_ 2008 
PARTG 
LEGAL ACTIONS UNDER THIS CHAPTER -
PROCEDURES, REQUIREMENTS, DAMAGES, AND 
.- LIMITATIONS ON JUDGME~~ _ .- .. 
• . ' - - • • • 1 1 
63G:7-601. Actions governed by Utah Rules of, Civil 
Procedure - Und~rtaking required. , · · . 
(ll -An action brought under this cliapter shall lie governed 
by the' Utah Rules · of Civil Procedure to the extent that they, 
are consistent witli .this chapter. . .-~ 
(2) At .the time tlie action is filed, the plaintiff shall file ah 
u.ndertllk:ing ~ a sum fixed by the court that is: (a),_ nqt l~ss than $300; and . . . . , . . . . 
(b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of ta.si:: 
able costs incurred by the governmental entity in the 
action if the plai..iltiff fails to prosecute the action or fails 
to, ~Jco~er judgment. · · · . · · · 2008 
'63_(?:-7-602. Compromise and settlement of cla;ims. 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with .its legal 
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a leg'al officer, 
may comprollllse and settle any action as to the damages or 
other relief sought. · · · ·. · 
(2) The risk manager in the Department ·of Administrative 
Services may compromis!! and settle any ac;ion against the 
state for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable: 
·(a)· on the .risk manager's own authority; if the amount 
· of the settlement is $26,000 or iess; ' 
(b) with the concurrence of the attor~ej general or the 
attorney general's representative and the executive direc-
tor 'of'the Department of Administrative Services if the 
amount of the settlement is $25,000.01 to $100,000; or 
(c) by complying with the procedures and requirements 
· ofTitle 63G, Chapter· 10, State Settlement Agreements, if 
the amount of the settlement is more than $100,000. 
I 2008 
63G-7-603. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited 
- Governmental entity exempt from execu-
tfon, attachment, or garnishment. 
(1) (a) A judgment may not be rendered against a govern-
mental entity for ex~mplary or punitive damages. 
(' 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KANE COUNTY HOSPITAL, 
Respondent. 
LORI RAMSAY and DAN SMALLING, 
Intervenors. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
File No. 09-22R 
Hearing Officer: J. Dennis Frederick 
A hearing was held on August 9, 2013, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer, J. 
Dennis Frederick, on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Respondent Kane 
County Hospital (the "Hospital"). The Hospital was represented by Timothy B. Anderson and 
Mark D. Tolman. Petitioner, the Utah State Retirement Board ("URS" or "Retirement Office"), 
was represented by David B. Hansen, Liza J. Eves, and Erin L. Gill. Intervenors Lori Ramsay 
and Dan Smalling were represented by Brian S. King. 
The Hospital seeks a partial summary judgment that URS's claim for retirement 
contributions in this case is limited by the applicable three year statute of limitations to the 
period between August 11, 2006 (three years before this Board Action was filed) and April 30, 
2009 (when the Hospital opted out of any requirement that it participate in the State Retirement 
Systems). Based upon the undisputed facts, and for the reasons stated in the Hospital's Motion 
and supporting papers, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued a decision granting the 
Hospital's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on August 9, 2013. 
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STIPULATED UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the following facts for purposes of this Motion only. The parties 
reserved the right to challenge these facts in any subsequent hearing in this matter. 
1. Kane County Hospital (hereinafter the "Hospital") is a special service district 
within the meaning of Utah Code § 17D-1-101, et seq. The special service district was created 
by the Kane County Commission in 1989 to operate the only hospital in Kane County. 
2. The Hospital, as a special service district, was an employer as defined under Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-11-102(23)(a) at all time relevant to this dispute. 
3. The Utah State Retirement Office is an independent state agency, which is also 
known and functions as the Utah Retirement Systems (hereafter "URS" or "Retirement Office"). 
URS was created pursuant to Utah Code, Title 49, to administer the systems, plans and programs 
of the various state retirement systems and performs all other functions assigned to it under Title 
49, the "Utah Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act" (the "Retirement Act"). 
4. In 1993, the Hospital began offering a 401 (k) plan to its employees. Since that 
time, the 401 (k) plan has been the only retirement benefit paid by the Hospital to its employees. 
5. On January 5, 2007, Intervenor Lori Ramsay, an employee of the Hospital, spoke 
with Cindy Bon, Accounts Service Manager for the Retirement Office, to obtain information 
about state retirement benefits. Thereafter, the Retirement Office sent Ms. Ramsay a letter with 
the information that Ms. Ramsay requested and a copy of a Retirement New Group 
Questionnaire, which Ms. Ramsay provided to the Hospital. The purpose of the Retirement New 
Group Questionnaire is to determine eligibility for participation in the State Retirement Systems. 
6. On January 22, 2007, the Hospital completed the Retirement New Group 
Questionnaire and returned it to the Retirement Office. 
2 
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7. The Retirement Office was unaware that the Hospital was providing any kind of 
retirement benefit to its employees until the Retirement Office received the Hospital's completed 
New Group Questionnaire. 
8. On February 12, 2007, the Retirement Office informed the Hospital that it was 
eligible for membership in the State Retirement Systems. The Hospital declined to make any 
retrospective or prospective retirement contributions to the State Retirement Systems. 
9. On April 30, 2009, pursuant to legislation passed by the Utah State Legislature in 
the 2009 General Legislative Session, the Hospital's Board of Directors approved a resolution to 
irrevocably elect nonparticipation in the State Retirement Systems. 
10. On August 11, 2009, the Retirement Office initiated this administrative 
proceeding by filing a Notice of Board Action against the Hospital. In its Notice of Board 
Action, the Retirement Office seeks an order declaring that, pursuant to the Retirement Act, the 
Hospital is liable for contributions to the State Retirement Systems for the years between 1993, 
when the Hospital first offered a 401(k) plan, and April 30, 2009, when the Hospital elected not 
to participate in the State Retirement Systems. 
11. To date, the Retirement Office has received no retirement contributions from the 
Hospital on behalf of its employees. 
UNSTIPULATED UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The parties did not stipulate to the following facts. Nevertheless, there is no dispute about 
them. 
12. There is no evidence in the record that the Hospital actually knew about any 
possible requirement that it report and make retirement contributions to the State Retirement 
3 
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Systems prior to February 12, 2007-when URS informed the Hospital that it was eligible to 
participate. 
13. There is no evidence in the record that the Hospital actively or affirmatively 
concealed its 401 (k) plan from URS or anyone else. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
URS contends that the Hospital, as a special service district, was an employer as defined 
under the Retirement Act at all times relevant to this dispute. The Hospital disputes that 
contention. However, for purposes of this Motion only, the parties asked the Adjudicative 
Hearing Officer to assume for sake of argument that the Hospital was an eligible employer under 
the Retirement Act, and thus able to participate in the State Retirement Systems. Thus, the 
following conclusions of law assume that the Hospital was an employer as defined under the 
Retirement Act. The Hospital may challenge this assumption, and its underlying liability under 
the Retirement Act, at any subsequent hearing in this matter. 
1. 
305(4). 1 
A three year statute of limitation period applies to this case. See U.C.A. § 78B-2-
2. In limited circumstances, the "discovery rule may operate to toll the period of 
limitations until the discovery of the facts forming the basis for the cause of action." Colosimo v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436,120. The discovery rule is applied 
in only three narrow situations: 
1 Relying on U.C.A. § 49-11-601(3), URS contends that a claim for retirement contributions 
under the Retirement Act does not accrue until 60 days following the end of each payroll period. 
Thus, URS contends that the statute of limitations does not begin to run on a claim for retirement 
contributions until 60 days after the end of each payroll period. However, the issue of when a 
claim for retirement benefits accrues under the Retirement Act is not part of the Hospital's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer declines 
to issue any ruling about that issue at this time. 
4 
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(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations 
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has 
prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Russell/Packard Dev. Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, 113. 
3. Here, there is no discovery rule mandated by statute. As a result, the limitations 
period on URS' s contribution claim may only be equitably tolled upon a showing of concealment 
or exceptional circumstances. For the reasons stated below, and in the papers filed by the 
Hospital in support of its Motion, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer concludes that URS is not 
entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 
4. The exceptional circumstances version of the equitable discovery rule requires a 
~ ( showing that URS will suffer some hardship if the statute of limitations is imposed. See Berneau 
l . 
\_j 
v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, 1 23. URS concedes that tolling under the exceptional circumstances 
version of the equitable discovery rule is not appropriate in this case. See URS Memo. in 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 16. URS will not suffer harm if the 
limitation period is imposed because a URS member shall not receive years of service credit if 
retirement contributions are not paid to URS by the employer. See U.C.A. § 49-11-102(48)(a). 
Accordingly, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer finds that exceptional circumstances do not exist 
in this matter to warrant tolling of the statute of limitations. 
5. Tolling under the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule also 
requires a showing that URS will suffer harm if the statute of limitations is imposed. 
Russell/Packard, 2003 UT App 316, iJ 13 ("genesis" of concealment version 1s equitable 
estoppel); Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ,r 23 (injury is an element of equitable estoppel). 
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6. Additionally, tolling under the concealment version of the equitable discovery 
rule requires a showing that the Hospital actively or affirmative concealed its 40 I (k) plan from 
URS. See Russell Packard, 2003 UT App 316, at ,r 27; Russell/Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 
UT 14, 1138-39, see Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, ~ 49; 
see also Utah State Retirement Board v. Utah Risk Management Mutual Association, File No. 
11-09, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order dated August 6, 2012 and adopted by 
the Retirement Board on August 9, 2012 (finding the equitable discovery rule did not apply 
without evidence that the Respondent "actively concealed its status or engaged in misleading 
conduct with respect to URS"). 
7. There is no evidence in the record that the Hospital actively or affirmatively 
concealed its 40l(k) plan from URS. Without such evidence, the concealment version of the 
equitable discovery rule does not apply. 
8. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer declines to extend Utah law to allow for tolling 
of the limitation period when a Respondent is silent about even an unknown statutory reporting 
obligation. Equitable tolling under such circumstances is not warranted by Utah law under 
Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14 and Colosimo, 2007 UT 25. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Hospital's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. URS's claim for retirement contributions in this case is limited by the applicable 
three year statute of limitations to contribution claims that arose between August 11, 2006 and 
April 30, 2009. 
6 
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DATED this __ day of August, 2013. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM BY: 
J. Dennis Frederick 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
HOWARD, ANDERSEN, HANSEN, & EVES 
David B. Hansen 
LizaJ. Eves 
Erin L. Gill 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
BRIAN S. KING, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for Intervenors 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
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DATED this_day of August, 2013. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM BY: 
J. Dennis Frederick 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
HOW ARD, ANDERSEN, HANSEN, & EVES 
David B. Hansen 
LizaJ, Eves 
Erin 1. Gill 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
BRIANS. KING, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
p__· s.c 
Brian S. King 7 
Attorney for Intervenon 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Timothy C. Houpt 
Mark D. Tolman 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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DATED this~ day of August, 2013. .') 
! ' 
APPROVED AS TO FORM BY: 
5;$iC~.&~ 
LizaJ, Eves 
ErinL. Gill 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
BRIANS. KING, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for lntervenors 
'. 
'. i ; 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Timothy C. Houpt 
MarkD. Tolman 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KANE COUNTY HOSPITAL, 
Respondent. 
LORI RAMSAY and DAN SMALLING, 
Intervenors. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT, . 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
File No. 09-22R 
Hearing Officer: J. Dennis Frederick 
A hearing was held on April 29, 2015, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer, J. Dennis 
Frederick, on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Respondent Kane County Hospital (the 
"Hospital") and the Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Intervenors Lori Ramsay and 
Dan Smalling ("Intervenors"). The Hospital was represented by Timothy B. Anderson and Mark 
D. Tolman. Petitioner, the Utah State Retirement Board ("URS" or "State Retirement Office"), 
was represented by David B. Hansen and Erin L. Gill. Intervenors Lori Ramsay and Dan 
Smalling were represented by Brian S. King. 
By their Statement of Claim, Intervenors seek an order that the Hospital make retirement 
contribution payments to the State Retirement Systems to fund service credits on their behalf 
between 1993 and April 30, 2009. The Hospital seeks a summary judgment that Intervenors' 
claim for retirement contributions arising between August 11, 2006 and April 30, 2009 is moot 
and must be dismissed because the Hospital has funded contributions in the State Retirement 
Systems for them during this period. The Hospital also seeks a summary judgment dismissing 
Intervenors' claim for retirement contributions arising prior to August 11, 2006 as barred by the 
I 193163_1 
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statute of limitations. Intervenors seek a summary judgment to establish the Hospital's liability 
for retirement contributions under the State Retirement Act. 
Based upon the undisputed facts, and for the reasons stated in the Hospital's Motion and 
supporting papers, the ~djudicative Hearing Officer issued a decision granting the Hospital's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying as moot the Intervenors' Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, on April 29, 2015. 
STIPULATED UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the following facts for purposes of this Motion only. 
1. The Hospital is a special service district within the meaning of Utah Code § 17D-
1-101, et seq. The special service district was created by the Kane County Commission in 1989 
to operate the only hospital in Kane County. 
2. Kane County Hospital, as a special service district, was an employer as defined 
under Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-102(23)(a) at all times relevant to this dispute. 
3. In 1993, the Hospital began offering a 401 (k) retirement plan to its employees. 
4. Intervenor Lori Ramsay participated in the Hospital's 401(k) retirement plan from 
January 1, 1994 through July 20, 2007. 
5. Intervenor Daniel Smalling participated in the Hospital's 401 (k) retirement plan 
from October 7, 1995 through July 22, 2000. 
6. On January 5, 2007, Intervenor Lori Ramsay, an employee of the Hospital, spoke 
with Cindy Bon, Accounts Service Manager for the Utah State Retirement Office ("Retirement 
Office"), to obtain information about state retirement benefits. Thereafter, the Retirement Office 
sent Ms. Ramsay a letter with the information that Ms. Ramsay requested and a copy of a 
Retirement New Group Questionnaire, which Ms. Ramsay provided to the Hospital. The purpose 
2 
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of the Retirement New Group Questionnaire is to determine eligibility for participation in the 
State Retirement Systems. 
7. On January 22, 2007, the Hospital completed the Retirement New Group 
Questionnaire and returned it to the Retirement Office. 
8. On February 12, 2007, the Retirement Office informed the Hospital that it was 
eligible for membership in the State Retirement Systems. The Hospital declined to make any 
retrospective or prospective retirement contributions to the State Retirement Systems. 
9. On April 30, 2009, pursuant to legislation passed by the Utah State Legislature in 
the 2009 General Legislative Session, the Hospital's Board of Directors approved a resolution to 
irrevocably elect nonparticipation in the State Retirement Systems. 
10. The Hospital has paid all retirement contributions to the Retirement Office on 
behalf of the Intervenors for the period of time between June 20061 and April 30, 2009. 
11. The Retirement Office has granted each of the Intervenors retirement service 
credit for the entire time period for which retirement contributions were received (i.e., June 2006 
through April 30, 2009). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Intervenors contend that the Hospital, as a special service district, was an employer as 
defined under the Retirement Act at all times relevant to this dispute. The Hospital disputes that 
contention. However, for purposes of the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment only, the 
parties asked the Adjudicative Hearing Officer to assume for sake of argument that the Hospital 
was an eligible employer under the Retirement Act, and thus able to participate in the State 
1 The Hospital funded retirement contributions from June 2006 through April 30, 2009, rather 
than from August 11, 2006, because the Retirement Office took the position that a claim for 
retirement contributions does not accrue until 60 days following the end of each pay period. 
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Retirement Systems. Thus, the following conclusions of law assume that the Hospital was an 
employer as defined under the Retirement Act. 
1. A three year statute of limitation period applies to this case. See U.C.A. § 78B-2-
305(4). 
2. At the hearing on April 29, 2015, Intervenors argued that the claim they have 
made against the Hospital for retirement contributions has not yet accrued and will not accrue 
until they retire. Intervenors are judicially stopped from asserting this argument, which is 
contrary to the position they have taken all along in this case-that they have a right to seek 
retirement contribution payments from the Hospital now. However, even if Intervenors were not 
judicially stopped from making this argument, the claim they have made for retirement 
contributions has already accrued. 
3. The statute of limitations begins to run upon the last act that forms the basis of the 
claim. See Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436,, 18. In a 
claim arising under the Retirement Act for retirement contributions against a participating 
employer, the last act that forms the basis of the claim is when the employer does not pay 
required retirement contributions to the State Retirement Office. 
4. Thus, Intervenors claim for contributions against the Hospital began to run at the 
end of each pay period when retirement contributions should have been paid to the State 
Retirement Office. The Utah State Retirement Board recognized this in passing Resolution 13-
05, which states in relevant part, "a cause of action arises under Utah Code § 49-11-613 when a 
payment is or should have been paid .... " 
5. Intervenors' . argument that a claim for retirement contributions does not accrue 
until the age of retirement contravenes the purpose of the statute of limitations to encourage 
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litigants to diligently seek out and file their claims in a timely manner. A ruling that the statute 
does not begin to run until Intervenors retire would allow a claimant to sit on a claim for decades 
while interest accrues, documents are lost, memories fade, and witnesses pass away. 
6. Accordingly, the statute of limitations in this case bars Intervenors' claims for 
retirement contributions that should have been paid to the State Retirement Office prior to 
August 11, 2006, three years before the Retirement Board initiated this matter by filing its Notice 
of Board Action.2 
7. The Hospital has already funded retirement contributions for the Intervenors for 
the period of time within the statute of limitations-between August, 11, 2006 and April 30, 
2009 (the date the Hospital elected nonparticipating in the State Retirement Systems). Thus, the 
lntervenors' claim to retirement contributions for this period of time is moot and must be 
dismissed. 
8. For the reasons stated below, and in the papers filed by the Hospital in support of 
its Motion, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer concludes that Intervenors are not entitled to tolling 
of the statute of limitations for their claim to retirement contributions arising prior to August 11, 
2006. 
9. In limited circumstances, the "discovery rule may operate to toll the period of 
limitations until the discovery of the facts forming the basis for the cause of action." Colosimo v. 
2 The Retirement Office contends that the statute of limitations does not begin to run on a claim 
for retirement contributions until 60 days after the end of each payroll period because it allows 
for a 60 day grace period to pay retirement contributions. Thus, the statute of limitations may 
extend to June 11, 2006 (three years and 60 days prior to the filing of the Notice of Board 
Action). The Hearing Officer declines to issue a ruling on this issue because the Hospital has 
already paid retirement contributions for the Intervenors from June 2006 through April 30, 2009. 
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Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436, ,r 20. The discovery rule is applied 
in only three narrow situations: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations 
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has 
prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Russell/Packard Dev. Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, ,r 13. 
10. Here, there is no discovery rule mandated by statute. As a result, the limitations 
period on Intervenors' contribution claim may only be equitably tolled upon a showing of 
concealment or exceptional circumstances. 
11. "However, before a statute of limitations may be tolled under the equitable 
discovery rule, [Intervenors] must make an initial showing that [they] did not know nor should 
have reasonably known the facts underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably comply 
with the limitations period." See Helfrich v. Adams, 2013 UT App 37, ,r 9, 299 P.3d 2 (internal 
quotation and alteration marks omitted). In other words, "[t]he limitations period is postponed 
only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal theories." Anderson 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575,579 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
12. Intervenors' contribution claim arises from a single fact: the Hospital's provision 
of a 401 (k) plan. Intervenors argue that when the Hospital provided a 401 (k) benefit to them, it 
was required by the State Retirement Act to also participate in the State Retirement Systems and 
to make contributions to the State Retirement Systems on their behalf. 
13. Intervenors have known about the fact underlying their cause of action-the 
'-') provision of a 401 (k) plan-since at least the mid-1990s. Although Intervenors may not have 
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discovered their legal theory until much later, the belated discovery of a legal theory does not 
justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 
14. Accordingly, because lntervenors have not made the required threshold showing 
that they did not know, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying their claim 
in this case in time to bring a timely cause of action, they are not entitled to equitable tolling. 
15. Even if Intervenors could make· this threshold showing, neither concealment nor 
exceptional circumstances would justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 
16. The Hospital has not concealed its 40 I (k) plan from Intervenors, who admit 
knowledge of the 401 (k) plan dating back to the mid- l 990s. 
17. Instead, Intervenors argue that the Hospital engaged in concealment when it failed 
to comply with the reporting obligations of the State Retirement Act. However, there is no 
evidence in the record that the Hospital actually knew about any possible requirement that it 
report and make retirement contributions to the State Retirement Systems prior to February 12, 
2007-when URS informed the Hospital that it was eligible to participate. 
18. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer declines to extend Utah law to allow for tolling 
of the limitation period when a Respondent is silent about an unknown statutory reporting 
obligation. Equitable tolling under such circumstances is not warranted by Utah law. 
19. Exceptional circumstances also do not justify tolling of the statute of limitations. 
Tolling under an exceptional circumstances theory "'turns ori a balancing test' that 'examines 
[t]he hardship the statute oflimitations would impose on the plaintiff ... [against] any prejudice 
to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time."' Helfrich v. Adams, 
2013 UT App 37, ,r 18, 299 P.3d. 2 (quoting Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ,r 23, 223 P.3d 
1128). 
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20. The Hospital did not impose a hardship on the Intervenors when it provided a 
401(k) benefit to them-a benefit the Hospital had no obligation to provide. If the Hospital had 
never provided a 401(k) benefit to Intervenors, they would have no legal theory entitling them to 
benefits in the State Retirement Systems and would have received no retir.ement benefit at all. 
Exceptional circumstances are not present when the Hospital's conduct actually made 
Intervenors better of£ 
21. Further, the Hospital's ability to seek indemnification from third parties for 
liability dating back to 1993 would be impaired from difficulties of proof caused by the passage 
of time. Such difficulties could have been mitigated if Intervenors had not waited until January 
2007 to investigate their possible entitlement to benefits in the State Retirement Systems. 
22. Accordingly, there are also no exceptional circumstances that justify equitable 
tolling of the limitation period. 
23. Because Intervenors' claim for retirement contributions arising prior to August 
11, 2006 is barred by the statute of limitations, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer declines to 
consider the merits of Intervenors' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED and Intervenors' claim is DISMSSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER 
ORDERED that Intervenors' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot. 
DATED this ~y of _ __,,l't;{f-,:q---n2015. . 
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